

SĀMĀKHYA AND MODERN THOUGHT

J. GHOSH, M.A., Ph.D.
Principal, Ananda Mohan College

THE BOOK COMPANY, LTD.
CALCUTTA, INDIA.

Published by
GOSWAMI MITRA,
4 17, Coleridge Square, Calcutta.

PREFACE.

An eminent English administrator and scholar commented, while visiting this College a few years ago, on the anomaly of the arrangement under which students who intended to offer Philosophy for the Bachelor's degree were not required to have some knowledge of indigenous systems of thought. On the other hand, an Indian gentleman of light and leading was pleased to observe, while animadverting on my advocacy of oriental learning in my 'Higher Education in Bengal', that with the exception of a few poetical thoughts there was very little in Sanskrit literature beyond what was calculated to extend and consolidate the unjust domination of a particular section of society over the rest of it. I then believed, as I still do, that unless we turn to it for sweetness and light, our culture must remain a drawing-room accomplishment, fitted to enable us to talk glibly and even well on a variety of subjects but incapable of giving an organic unity to our life and work, influenced as they are bound to be not only by new motives and aspirations but by old ways of thinking and feeling as well for they are in the blood that courses in our veins. But as dogmatism on the subject might be met by dogmatism, I decided to let the candid reader judge.

measure by the interesting observations of modern writers on the subject and to whom, therefore, my thanks are due. I have also to make my acknowledgments to my friend, Dr. Mahendra Nath Sarkar of Sanskrit College, for certain valuable suggestions.

ANANDA MOHAN COLLEGE,
MYMENSINGH.

JAJNESWAR GHOSH.

January 17, 1930.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I

The Scope of the Sāmkhya	1
--------------------------	-----	-----	---

CHAPTER II

Bondage and the Soul	12
----------------------	-----	-----	----

CHAPTER III

The mind and the Soul	25
-----------------------	-----	-----	----

CHAPTER IV

Nature and the Soul	44
---------------------	-----	-----	----

CHAPTER V

Deliverance	84
-------------	-----	-----	----

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion	111
------------	-----	-----	-----

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

- A. for the Commentary of Aniruddha on the Sāṃkhya
Sūtras.
- V.B. for the Commentary of Vijnāna Bhikṣu on the
Sāṃkhya Sūtras.
- G. for the Commentary of Gaudapāda on the Sāṃkhya
Kārikās.
- V. for the Commentary of Vāchaspati Miśra on the
Sāṃkhya Kārikās.
- T.S. for Tattva Samāsa.
- P.S. for Panchasikha Sūtras.

The figures behind the abbreviations give the number
of the chapter and the *sūtra* or of the verse.

ERRATA.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCOPE OF THE *Sāṃkhya*.

Aversion to misery and not desire for happiness comes to be in the long run the master-impulse of the human mind. It is this conviction which directs enquiry and colours conclusion at almost every step in the *Sāṃkhya*. The reality of happiness is not denied. Nor is any weight attached to the theory which would resolve it into the negation of suffering.¹ But a relatively subordinate place is assigned to it both as a factor of human experience and as a goal of human activity.

Why? Because misery is so alien to our nature that we would eliminate it even if in doing so we must rule out happiness as well.² Speculative subtlety may delight in speaking of either of them in terms of the other. But we cannot in our scheme of life here or hereafter set off joys against sorrows. Besides, the latter are so many and so various, while happiness is so rare and so mixed up with suffering that wisdom hesitates to draw a line between them.³

¹ *S. N. 1. 1. 1. 1.*

² *S. N. 1. 1. 1. 1. VI 1.*

³ *S. N. 1. 1. 1. 1. VI 1. 1. 1.*

And yet the craving for enjoyment plays a considerable part in the economy of life. We must not confound it with a much more intense feeling, the longing for the cessation of misery. The former dominates so long as the objects of the world attract and interest us. But with widening experience there is a growing distaste for that unrest which is called bliss and a growing realization of the universality of pain. The vividapture in living disappears and is replaced by a nervous preoccupation with our liability to suffering. Human nature shrinks from it and strives thenceforth for deliverance with a yearning which is more powerful and persistent than the longing for the highest forms of gratification.

It is not correct, therefore, that nothing can be an end which is not related to the desire for happiness. This desire itself sickens when exposed to the light of experience, while the conviction gains ground that misery must be avoided at all costs. Thus at any moment men may be divided into two classes, those who seek happiness and those who seek to avoid it if they could eschew all sorts of suffering. But the first represent a transitional stage for the transitoriness of joys

comes sooner or later to be discovered. They are felt also to involve suffering as a consequence if not as a concomitant. And repeated disenchantment of this sort brings home the truth that misery is bondage and deliverance from it the highest end of man.⁵

But even if suffering outweighs enjoyment at present, must it be always thus? Is it not likely that in subsequent lives the account will be set right by showing a balance of pleasures over pains? Yes, in higher orders of existence and in better worlds than ours, the sum of pleasures will, no doubt, increase. But even in them disease, decay and death will be present. And where these are, the balance is bound to be unfavourable. Moreover, the cycle of existence is like an arch with a turning-point somewhere, so that progress in enjoyment must entail equivalent retrogression as its inevitable counterpart.⁶

It is needless then to go into details about the nature of happiness and its conditions. We have only to note that it is transitory and contingent and that the ardour with which it is sought cannot compare with the eagerness with which misery is shunned. But may not happiness be purer in other worlds and be

any claim on external conditions? No, we have no grounds for assuming that it will be any different from what we have in human experience. The *raison d'être* makes, in fact, no mystery on this point. Pleasures and pains elsewhere are not unlike what they are here. So there is really no reason for concluding that the pleasures are ever less dreaded than they are in human life.

An enquiry into the causes of suffering is, therefore, of primary importance. It may be due to defects in our constitution physical and mental or to activities of other creatures or to operations of the forces of nature. Our longing after the good things of the world is a prolific source of suffering. Our bodies are liable to painful diseases. We suffer often at the hands of our fellow-creatures. The wild animals are our natural enemies, and they rob of us. Lastly, they who preside over the various departments of nature are not always friendly, and we cannot choose but suffer when they are hostile. Thus, broadly speaking, pains may be grouped under three heads, viz. those which originate in us, those for which other creatures are responsible and those which are due to agencies like flood and fire.

But do not science and art and our overflowing resources provide an escape out of their clutches? We have remedies that allay suffering and cure disorders. The bountiful Earth caters for us, and where she fails, art steps in to supply a profusion of nice things for our delectation. Then there are treatises replete with practical wisdom, which teach us how to fortify ourselves against the enmity of man and beast. And lastly there are charms and talismans that serve to propitiate angry gods and to disarm the malignity of demons.

These, however, do not go far enough. We do not possess recipes for all sorts of evils, nor can we use what we possess in every conceivable circumstance. Besides, troubles do not come singly, and while those of the mind are being looked after, physical disorders may grow and multiply. Panaceas are thus unknown to art and experience, and even the Vedic sacrifices, which are so loudly enjoined, are not panaceas in the proper sense of the term. For whatever their efficacy may be, they cannot be productive of unalloyed good, imperfect and stained as they are with the sin of cruelty to animals. Moreover, their effect cannot be permanent, because like the effect of other kinds of activity that are bounded by

at a certain time, they must terminate sooner or later."

We are constrained, therefore, to turn to philosophy for a remedy, and to philosophy alone, for every other thing, because it goes beyond the ordinary resting-places of experience, which turn out on examination to be no resting-places at all. Its maxims are, indeed, difficult to comprehend and still more difficult to apply.¹¹ But we have not much of a choice in the matter. The usual lenitives are uncertain and partial in their operation. And what we want is extinction of misery in all its countless forms and without any the remotest possibility of its recurrence. That would be deliverance, indeed, and nothing short of that would satisfy our nature. Nice things, wealth and virtue are, no doubt, desirable. But finality cannot be claimed for them as ends, as the satisfaction obtained through their means is transitory and dependent on objects that form no part of our nature.¹² Transitoriness is a feature of suffering. But it makes up more largely than we think for the texture of our days and nights. It is a halting compromise between them

cannot ease the heart that throbs so frequently with pain.

The Sāmkhya appears so far to be broad-based on extensive experience. No proof is offered of the thesis that the desire for the cessation of suffering must be ultimately the strongest of our motives. But there is a tacit appeal to the fact that pleasures pall while miseries crowd upon us as we advance in life. It does not, indeed, disillusion all at the same time, and this is recognised when men are divided into two classes. There are sanguine natures, which do not give up the quest of happiness, even though it attracts only to repel. They do not, however, exhaust the list, for we come across others whom a long course of bitter experience has convinced of the futility of hopes and aspirations. The Sāmkhya claims, indeed, finality for the attitude of the latter. But in doing so, it asserts no more than the right of philosophy to interpret experience.

There is moreover a refreshing candour in this interpretation. While no attempt is made to explain away happiness, the view that in any conceivable circumstance it can be independent of all sort of delightful objects is dismissed with the observation that of such happiness we have no evidence.² What we

of the world as it is contingent and, therefore, necessarily uncertain. And even of this thin, light and evanescent happiness, there is no real superabundance. The Sāmkhya is therefore fully pessimistic. But it would be unfruitful to label it on that account as the product of the exponent of an age in which faith had ebbed and life had ebbed low. For such a view has been widely entertained even in the past, remarkable for the freshness of their ideas and the vigour of their undertakings.

The scope of the Sāmkhya has been carped at on the ground that knowledge for its own sake is the aim of philosophy and not knowledge for the attainment of any object, however noble, life or important. But every system of Indian philosophy is at variance with this conception of it. Intellectual curiosity or the desire to found schools might have led thinkers to that path elsewhere. Here, however, the compelling force has been always a practical one, the deliverance from the miseries of existence or attainment of the highest happiness as far as possible in it. And those who have felt this pressure have realised at the same time that the problem before them is not one to be shirked or waived at their pleasure. Philosophy has ever been in India an essentially direct and single-minded attempt to reach the knowledge that matters. It

has also shared with faith the place of honour among the abiding interests of her people owing to this direct and obvious bearing on their expectations and activities. They see, indeed, no real difference between the two except in the circumstance that philosophy tries to correct the vagueness that belongs to all impassioned thought on the question of man's lasting weal or woe.

The definition of philosophy will vary, of course, with the philosophy that we accept. But in the West too it has exhibited as a rule an unconscious practical bias and developed sometimes into a pronounced effort to direct human activity and aspiration. In fact, the curiosity which gives birth to philosophy differs from ordinary curiosity in the circumstance of its being not altogether unmotived. Unlike inferior animals, man is never content with the unvarying repetition of the same round of activities, but strives continually to improve them. The feeling of discontent or unrest which urges him on is not, however, an unerring light on the road of progress. But it blazes forth sometimes into science and philosophy, the former defining the conditions under which he must work, while the latter

relationship between ethics and philosophy is not to be understood as each of them pre-empting the other. Even if philosophy is only a vision of things from above with the object of comprehending their intelligible plan, it cannot make abstraction of our ends, for these are certainly included in the order of things. Not things made but things in the making constitute the sum total of existence. And things in the making our aims and aspirations occupy a unique position as being the best known and most important to us. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Sāṃkhya transcends the limits proper of philosophy in reserving a prominent place to their discussion.

If, indeed, philosophy is suffered to tackle problems which science and practical life suggest but do not solve, it is because they are tackled in a way that is felt to be emotionally valuable. Its results lack the security of positive knowledge and its methods compare unfavourably with scientific induction in simplicity and conclusiveness. Moreover, it is exceptionally pre-occupied with theories under the understandable impression that an appropriate rule may be found in them for every fact that presents itself to inquiry and interpretation. All with all these defects, it occupies an

honourable place among objects of study because of its reasoned statement of man's relations with his universe both as they are and as they ought to be.

CHAPTER II.

RENDERING AND THE SOUL.

Liberty and bondage are convertible terms in the Sikhya. Bondage denotes, therefore, in this system much more than it does in ordinary parlance. Limitation of any sort by an external force is, of course, included in it. But it comprehends also modifiability even when it is in accordance with an inner law. For limitation in certain ways at least is implied in the very possibility of modification. And whether it may be for the better as for the worse, yet since unbroken and endless progress is an impossibility, even improvement is sure to come to a stop of rueful experience, so that modifiability, however it may express itself, is very far from the perfection of freedom.

Let us look a little more closely into the
 position. Erroneous views bind us. So
 do interests in things that are foreign to our
 mission. And we limit or hurt ourselves when
 we yield to the urgency of desires or let
 passion thwart us or acknowledge the

cramping influence of antipathy. But can freedom be secured by eliminating them? No, for even impulses and activities that originate in less turbid emotions and thoughts may not be trusted to protect us from thralldom. Piety, for instance, is but a limited good resulting in a limited gain, if by piety we understand the due performance of religious ceremonies. And the same may be said of the effort to attain transcendental powers by contemplation and self-denial.¹⁵ Even the surfeit that is born of enjoyment, the disconcerting discovery that all is hollowness beneath the shimmer of joy does not go far enough. So he who cares for freedom should cease to care for these on the ground that the benefit derivable from them must be transitory and circumscribed.

If, however, every form of limitation is misery, then life as known to us comes to be synonymous with it. Wherever there is determination, wherever there is definiteness, there also weakness is. Our mental processes, which have their fixed and narrow grooves, are *ipso facto* imperfect and, therefore, tainted with suffering. Our knowledge too has the same defect in as much as it is knowledge of this and not that or of this as distinguished from

But to find all our faculties are in a sense victims of weakness and misery because they are definite amounts of energy seeking expression in more or less restricted forms of activity.

But may not good deeds be our salvation from this besetting weakness, if not in this world, at any rate in a more exalted sphere of existence? Is it unreasonable to expect that in the enlargement of self caused by their performance, distraction and weakness will be ultimately replaced by undivided unity, freedom and repose? They are productive, indeed, of happiness and power. But there is no reason for assuming that these effects will be absolute or eternal. The consequence of every type of activity is limited like the activity itself and as a matter of fact proportional to it. It would be illogical, therefore, to suppose that the so-called reward of virtue would transcend this principle of correspondence between cause and effect.¹⁵ Goodness does, it is true, breed goodness. But our codes of morality are limited in their scope and therefore in their beneficial influence. So our habits based on them may come at last to resemble like bad ones. And in any case the state of being cannot be attained by en-

crusting our nature with a routine of activities, however laudable.

Besides, even if the guerdon of good deeds were unbounded in measure and absolute in purity, where should we expect it? Our experience here shows an admixture of affliction with happiness. And elsewhere too experience as such can offer no permanent satisfaction but only the prospect of ceaseless activity with its concomitant of joys and sorrows. The gods may have a more resplendent fabric of experience to boast of. But in it too the bright woof of happiness must cross a dark warp of misery. For it follows from the nature of experience and of sentient beings that the purple patches have to alternate with others of a very different hue. Hence so long as we do not get rid of our emotional outfit, misery, only more or less qualified, will continue to be our lot.

A sense of the pathos of life does, indeed, surge over us from whichever side we look at it. Then is deliverance from suffering a vain quest? The Sāṅkhya claims, however, to have discovered the road to it. Its answer, therefore, to this whispering of doubt and despair is a categorical negative. It refers in support of its position to the circumstance that the Scripture does not deliver us to the ultimate end of man and yet does not

permanence, since a reversal of the conditions of its genesis might then hurl it out of existence. Nor could it be secure for ever against harm or loss unless its rounded completeness warded off the very possibility of extraneous influence. The Sāṃkhya accepts, therefore, the dictum of the Scriptures that the soul is beginningless and companionless or unrelated to every other thing.

Even absolute isolation, however, cannot be an adequate safeguard against decay. For its seeds may lurk in the nature or composition of a thing. If, for instance, it is impure or defective or is compounded of factors that must separate sooner or later, then decay and disintegration will set in with the lapse of time without any sinister influence from outside. Purity, therefore, and absolute simplicity have to be predicated of the soul. It is effectually protected because it is aloof from all that is outside and free from all sorts of complexity within.*

This simplicity, however, is quite unlike that of objects which have clear-cut features. These owe their definiteness to forces and principles which are outside them and which may by a new collection take them out of

the object-world from it, we may go back indefinitely towards the soul, yet we can never reach it by way of perception, the observer being necessarily outside what he surveys. Thus it remains for ever self-withdrawn into an unfathomable depth, or rather would do so, were it not for a confusion between itself and the psychical elements which, while imaging the facts and features of the object-world, receive its light and pose as its states, thus investing it with a variety and transitoriness that are adventitious.

The soul, as distinct from these partial and evanescent thought-forms, has no defect to remove, no weakness to remedy. Fullness, completeness are the terms which should be employed in characterising it. It cannot be bounded by divisions of space nor cut up by moments of time, as these belong to the world of appearances, to the world in which every thing passes over and merges into something else, while movement and, indeed, activity of any kind must be denied to it, because they are possible only where owing to limitation

But are not these large assumptions? What is there in experience that might seem to justify them? The Sāmkhya refers to the Hindu Scriptures in support of its statements about the nature of the soul. But this is little more than customary deference, as instead of presenting them as so many postulates, it relies on an argument like the following for securing their acceptance. The unsophisticated human being longs for deliverance and believes it to be attainable. But if deliverance means, as it must, complete and permanent immunity from suffering, then no stain in the form of impurity or limitation can ever attach to the soul.² For once you admit such a possibility, you have no guarantee against a recurrence of the evil in the ceaseless flow of time and flux of conditions. The central doctrine of the Sāmkhya is that deliverance is attainable. If you are not prepared to assail it, you must concede that the soul transcends all sort of limitation and must ever and everywhere do so.

But is it reasonable to assume a plurality of souls so absolute in their freedom? Such a supposition is thrust upon us by the circumstance that all creatures are not born at the same time, nor does death overtake them in

the same hour.² There is also the endless diversity of their experience to be accounted for, no one being exactly like another either in his needs or in the modes in which these needs must be supplied. Some have, indeed, plausibly argued that the identical soul appears various under a variety of conditions just as the same sky looks clear in some places and overcast in others. But the soul is not like the sky made up of parts that lie outside one another. And so it cannot like the latter be the meeting-place of incongruous things.³

The Scriptures declare, it is true, that there is one soul. But the statement is calculated only to emphasise the absolute similarity that there is between one soul and another. It is hard, indeed, to reconcile this uniformity of pattern with diversity in behaviour and experience. But we have to set down this apparently recalcitrant fact to the credit of forces and principles that are really foreign to the souls but are erroneously identified with them. Much has, indeed, to be ascribed to their influence, whether we accept the doctrine of plurality of souls or not. For we cannot otherwise explain the outstanding facts of birth and death, the soul being regarded as

is not even by the monistic critics of the Sankhya.

But is there any very compelling reason in the circumstances for the hypothesis of a multiplicity of souls which are at the same time thoroughly alike in nature? The difference between them is said to lie in the media which break up and colour their light while reflecting it. Is not the plurality then confined to these media, and should we not fasten on them the responsibility for making that appear as various which is essentially one? The Sankhya answers the question in the negative. The ripples of circumstance, as they pass by, cannot place one and the same being in positions that are recognised to be incompatible. Birth and death, for instance, may not come to any one simultaneously. Besides, it is not sound logic to assume that the apparent unity of the world points to a unity of the informing spirit, for a hundred lamps of equal brilliance may light up a hall without any of them losing its individuality.

The Sankhya endorses thus the theory of plurality of souls because of its explanatory value. It would not get behind facts, nor would it resolve them by dialectical pressure and mere fictions. And among facts none is more patent to it than the dissimilarity between individuals in the matter of ex-

perience. They form, so to speak, isolated worlds in this respect, and the breaches between them seem to be all but absolute. Hence adverting to a universal observation, it commits itself to the theory of an irreducible pluralism so far as souls are concerned.

If, however, souls transcend all sorts of limit and are above every form of weakness, they are certainly above the need of deliverance. And yet the Sāṃkhya claims to guide erring mortals on the way to it. This anomaly is got over by observing that the bondage of the soul is due to its identification with alien objects. Self-centred and complete as each soul is, its connection with what are popularly regarded as its states and activities is fictitious, and so, of course, is the severance of this connection.² But the suffering that results from this fancied relation is a terrible reality. And hence the soul seeks deliverance from it and cannot rest till this deliverance is attained.

The Sāṃkhya tries to illustrate the nature of this bondage by a striking similitude. As white crystal appears red when in contact with hibiscus, the soul's suffering only to

crystal of the soul. But even this comparison is rejected only to be rejected on the ground that while contact with hibiscus and the flowering tint are real though transitory in the case of the crystal, the assimilation of the soul with what is outside it is absolutely groundless and appears, indeed, to be so to the trained mind of the philosopher, which can by difficult analysis penetrate beneath the crust of appearance and discover the reality that is ultimate.

CHAPTER III.

THE MIND AND THE SOUL.

The Sāṃkhya conception of the soul is thus widely different from what the uncritical mind usually takes it to be. For it is not the personal consciousness, the concrete *I* or *you* that is given directly in experience.⁷ Personality of this type resolves itself when analysed into reminiscences of the past and anticipations of the future converging on impressions and activities of the present moment. Its content, therefore, changes perpetually and is very unlike the timeless and spaceless entity with which it is identified in popular imagination. The Sāṃkhya stigmatises this uncritical assimilation as only next door to the scepticism of the Buddhists, who after analysing experience into its divers constituents regard the illusory notion of self as the outcome of their fleeting combination.

The soul, it is true, is generally believed to be something over and above the facts,

between it and its author on the one hand and that external world on the other the most complete of separations actual or imaginable! Mental facts seem to be incapable of abstraction from the soul to which they belong, though they may be conditioned by the material universe. Is it then not a long jump to assume a fundamental unity between these facts and events in the external world simply because there is a relation of sequence between the two series?

The reply of the Sāṅkhya to this question is strikingly in agreement with the trend of modern scientific opinion on the subject. Let us take the familiar forms of mental activity, viz., perception, recollection and inference. The first is, with an important reservation to be noticed hereafter, a form of reaction on the environment not unlike the behaviour of a material object in the presence of a stimulus to which it does respond. The second is more or less a matter of habit based on modifications of the apparatus of knowledge. So this too finds its analogue in the inanimate world, as when repetition of a certain movement creates a tendency to reproduce it under appropriate or familiar conditions. And the third is

identified being not unlike a newly
 sensation.

emotional states too, our likings and
 are bound up closely with acts of
 and share with them their humble

The Sankhya says that the soul and
 desires belong to different
 that under normal conditions they
 are absolutely unrelated. Consider
 the primitive form of desire. It
 arises in a certain physical condition and
 ceases when that condition changes, while
 the state in which it manifests itself is
 a physical state. But is it different with
 the known as higher forms of desire?
 At least spiritual longings exhibit, when
 a certain unmistakable affinity with our
 logical needs, these constituting as it
 the power station from which energy
 flows into various channels of activity.

of these activities, again, little need be

They are prompted by want, and they
 are a fuller, freer existence than that in
 a figure. But such purposiveness is
 confined to sentient creatures as it ap-
 pears in admittedly unconscious behav-
 ior. In fact, want and the effort to remove
 the characteristic of the limited, imperfect
 in the material world, while they
 refer to the penitence of the soul and its

consequent placidity. And the happiness in which such effort terminates is itself so unspiritual in its nature that the Sāṃkhya can not conceive of its existing apart from a physical structure.² Generally speaking, in sensible beauty do we find charm and solace, in line and colour and sound and taste or in their images satisfaction. Thus both in its origin and consummation as well as in its nature, human activity has very little to distinguish it from movements which apparently without conscious agency make for the well-being of organised structures in the external world.

The Sāṃkhya looks at the question from the direction of the mind and its faculties. When the mind comes to be related to any external object, it takes the form of the latter. This is its function, and it is generally known as the act of knowing. As objects are innumerable, the modifications of the mind must be equally so. But one way of grouping them is to put them under the two heads of pleasurable and painful states. Attachment, desire, hatred and anger are the painful ones, while amity, compassion, faith and reverence are distinctly pleasurable. The pleasure and pain are the objects of the mind's experience and are not to be confused with

form of reaction on the environment but a direct and faithful revelation of the latter. How then are we to think of the mind itself, the apparatus that takes the thought-photographs? Sensitivity like that of the photographic plate cannot satisfactorily account for its processes, since they imply a certain measure of activity. The mind goes forth to its object, grasps or comprehends the latter in the literal sense and does not wait for mere impressions. The resulting moulds or images differ, therefore, very much from those in wax or bronze or marble. But since they too are the outcome of activity, they have to be ascribed to a force or substance, subtler far it may be, but not altogether unlike what we come across in the external world. Mind and matter are, therefore, not removed from one another by an unbridgable gulf.

But is there nothing beyond their greater complexity and fineness to distinguish mental phenomena from those which belong to the external world? Yes, there is the supreme fact of consciousness. They are lit up by a light, which, like the glow of phosphorescence irradiates them so that they stand self-revealed. But it serves also to disclose that it is not self-revealed in so far as it invests them with a self-revelation which is not their own. The mind is not lit up by it, they appear to be. It is not that it is

beings and to be organised into a personality, into an agent that is and enjoyer. Their inherent automatism seems thus to be replaced by a free termination and the iron chain of necessity to be snapt so as to give them a latitude of provision and choice.

All this, however, is illusory. For no mental state can ever rise above the low level of an object for the use of the soul, however suited it may be for this purpose.²⁹ Nor can it by any amount of integration with other states or by the resulting unity of their aim and accomplishment become an end unto itself. All of them function for the sake of another, being, in fact, materials for its experience and enjoyment. And so could they be conceived as existing independently of the latter, they would appear to be dark, unconscious elements like the sights and sounds of the external world. Only they are finer and thus better fitted for subsistence in the steady and native light of the soul.

But should they not be regarded as akin to the soul whose purposes they serve? Further, does not the mere fact of their transposition in its light bear additional testimony to this kinship? No, all that it proves is that they lack the capacity for being known or felt.

which leads to their conversion into elements of knowledge or experience and that their special fitness in this respect constitutes the basis of their apparent connection with the soul which is pure consciousness. Beyond this we cannot go, for any closer relation between it and them cannot be asserted in view of the following significant facts.

The desires, affections and thoughts that seem to make up our consciousness are each of them transitory. They limit one another and are conditioned and controlled by external objects. And in the last resort they are dependent on a congenital apparatus of habits and tendencies of which they are the expression. How then can they make up what is neither composite nor mutable? How, again, can the mind which comprehends the manifold world under categories of finiteness claim kinship with it? Besides, this mind languishes for want of food and is rejuvenated when food is supplied. It must, therefore, be clothed with material objects and apart from the soul which is incapable both of development and decay.

But what does the soul or consciousness involve? We have observed that the Soul is

found in rival systems of thought, its divergence from them being as a matter of fact more marked than points of contact. It joins issue with Buddhist philosophy, which resolves consciousness into a series of transitory cognitive states, the idea of a permanent soul being set down as a mere figment based on the uninterrupted continuity of change.

In combating this doctrine of the Buddhists, it lays stress on the argument that recollection of the past would be impossible were the soul impermanent. And yet it does not favour the view that consciousness conserves the past while it looks out towards the future and thus advances along the route of time with an increasing store of reminiscences. Both memory and expectation belong to the mind which is modified by experience. And so they cannot be connected with the immutable and timeless soul.

In fact, all sorts of activity are denied to it on the ground that activity implies imperfection. The Sāṃkhya conception differs, therefore, materially from that of certain modern psychologists who regard consciousness as a selective agency that creates our world of picturesque light and shade out of an infinite variety of possible impressions on our senses. Attention, say they, is the key-word to it though attention is far from being a

universal feature of mental phenomena. But the Sāṃkhya cannot limit consciousness in this way by representing it as engaged at every stage in inhibiting certain possibilities in order to reinforce others. It is unfailing light, and whatever comes in contact with it is at once illumined thereby. If there are dark things in nature that do not recognise its transmuting influence, the fault is theirs, for as it is present everywhere and at all times, their darkness must be ascribed to their inherent incapacity for revelation.

Is this consciousness then a mere abstraction obtained by arbitrarily splitting up the concrete reality of experience into blind knowledge-stuff and the light in which it stands self-revealed? Does the system attribute a fictitious independence to what is but a mould or form having no separate existence from the sensuous contents to which it seems to belong? We cannot, indeed, distinguish consciousness from the manifold states which make up our phenomenal existence. But we may not infer from this inability that it exists only as

It is the soul then, inactive and unchangeable and indifferent as it is, serve only to connect the endless variety of psychic states which would otherwise be unrelated units? Or to picture them as the diversely coloured beads of a necklace placed side by side and held together by this metaphysical principle of combination which has none of their features? If, however, this colourless thread appears to us perpetually coloured by what it links together, there is, one may say, no good reason for distinguishing it from them, even if it is not discarded as a gratuitous assumption.

But the Sāmkhya holds that the soul would be no soul were it capable of being perceived like empirical realities. Hence the evidence of the testimony of the senses and the evidence of introspection to alight on it cannot be regarded as conclusive on this question of its existence, especially as it is testified to by the indubitable conviction of every individual that he exists. Does it not, however, amount to a tacit acknowledgment of the presence of the perishable body or of the equally perishable mind linked to it or lastly of the ceaseless flux of mental states of which there is direct experience? No, says the Sāmkhya, for the use of the word *ātman* in expressions like

'my body' or 'my mind' or 'my thought' shows clearly enough that they are owned.²

Now does the system say anything about the nature of this ownership? Yes, it cannot be like the hold of a substance over its attributes, for surely there does not exist between the immutable soul and its eminently mutable possessions that relation of identity which the *Sāṃkhya* discovers in the other pair. Nor can it be like the relation of a cause to its effects, for a cause is operative in space and time, while the soul is independent of both and above the need of activity. Nor, again, can it be like the relation between a thing and its aspects or stages, for the boundless amplitude of the soul admits of no distinctions or variations. Hence the only intelligible relation between the soul and its ideas and feelings, its joys and sorrows, its achievements and failures is that they are objects which it observes or takes note of. They form an ample scroll which is gradually unfolded and in which it imagines it reads its own fate.

Experience or enjoyment is then a key-

it is in relation enjoy what is outside it? How can it relate itself to the latter in spite of its complete exclusiveness? Besides, can reality in the fullest sense be predicated of what is related to? The answer of the Sāmkhya is that a real relation there is none. It is only a fancy, the result of indiscrimination in consequence of which movements in unconscious matter come to be regarded by the soul as its own states.

But is every movement of matter the immediate occasion for a conscious state? No, it must be reflected in a highly sensitive apparatus within the body before it can catch the light of the soul. Sensitivity, however, is not the only characteristic of this apparatus, as it is a powerful and complex instrument, capable of supplementing impressions from outside by desires and tendencies that were acquired and conserved in previous lives.

Is not this apparatus material? Certainly it is, only the stuff of which it is made is finer than that of external objects, its fineness consisting in the predominance of that factor of matter, which is equal to receiving and reflecting the light of consciousness. Hence the images in it of external objects and the thought-complexes that are elaborated out of them have the capacity of being known, i.e. they have a special fitness for entering into

relation with the soul, which, again, allows itself to be so related under the mistaken impression that they are not altogether foreign to its nature.²⁵

● Still the hiatus remains unbridged. For if the thought-complexes are material, how can the soul reach them from the other pole of existence? It is not enough to say that thought is not exactly like other material objects, but is only derived like them from a primitive stuff which is neither material nor mental in the ordinary sense, as to this stuff are assigned properties that make it the very antithesis of the soul. So to get over this difficulty, the Sāṃkhya makes a statement in a few passages which looks like a complete surrender of its dualism. The apparatus of cognition or the material of which it is formed is, it says, not unlike consciousness, from which it receives the vivifying light and in which it is in its turn imaged. And this significant concession appears to be dictated by the uncomfortable feeling that experience cannot be

For its explanation deserves a careful study because it directs attention to certain aspects of the problem that are not adequately stressed in modern speculation. It contrasts the absolute simplicity and immutability of the soul with the swirling confusion of the external world on the one hand and the ever-changing, kaleidoscopic forms of thought on the other. And it concludes that if the endless variety of things and events is foreign to the soul almost equally so is the flux of ideas in which they are imaged.

Our joys and interests seem, indeed, to be evanescent in a special sense. But take the most keenly felt among them, those that overflow with a bright and tender charm. We hug them close to our hearts and would, if possible, keep them to ourselves against all time. But they depart, so elusive are they, leaving behind poor, little toys of remembrance, which also must go sooner or later. We seem, indeed, to own them; but our hold is slight even when they are present, and we cannot always anticipate their coming. Indeed, we seldom know what is round the corner. It is, therefore, difficult to regard them as in any sense part and parcel of our being.

But while even the choicest of our emotions must be likened to frail flowers that wither when petals are seen as they are touched,

our personality, it is urged, cannot be classed with them, as it appears to be the central fact of our being, the bed-rock of our existence. And in this personality is revealed, according to some, the self that knows, the subject that relates itself to the object and thus builds up the marvellous superstructure of experience. It is held, indeed, to be the ultimate reality because while we cannot reduce it to matter and organism, their manifold forms are with some plausibility traced to it. And in any case the world of experience is the world of this personality, as thought exists only as the thought of a thinker.

All this is quite true. But it is beside the mark as a criticism of the Sāṅkhya, which emphasises, in fact, the very principles implied in it. This system goes, however, a step farther and observes that the personality which appears to fashion the world in thought and action is yet like it contingent and transitory and so cannot be offered as its metaphysical explanation. For this personality's influence

It is, with radiant health and keen sensibilities, and it seems to decline when life runs down. Thus both in its nature and mutations, this 'quintessence of dust' is not unlike the world which it creates and with which it is in perpetual contact through perception and volition.

But why should we seek a reality less impermanent and mutable in our effort to understand the world? Why, indeed, should we look for anything outside the stretched-out chain of causes and effects that make it up? It is because of the thought welling up from beyond the depths of experience of an abiding reality beside its passing shows. It is also because of the homing instinct in us, of the craving for deliverance from the distraction and restlessness that attend the achievements and failures of personality. We would be free from 'the fear that kills and the hope that is unwilling to be fed.' Above all, we want to attain that serenity which defies the menace of time; and in our coolest moments we recognise that this personality with its tense purposes and partial successes is, after all, limitation. It is, when rightly understood, repression and not reasonable expression of the reality that is in us.

The high instincts and impulses cannot be explained away or got rid of, whatever may

be our experience. They have, therefore, for us the finality of the best authenticated facts. Hence the Sāṃkhya posits a transcendental principle other than the empirical ego which is revealed to us in every form of knowledge and activity. While the manifold world with its fleeting forms and events is moulded by the latter, the former remains as it were on an unassailable pinnacle from start to finish, though owing to indiscrimination, it allows itself to be disturbed by troubles in the world below.

CHAPTER IV.

NATURE AND THE SOUL.

Thought and thing are then not so diverse in character as to point to separate sources. Apprehension is of like by like. Hence one primal stuff is adequate for the explanation of the mental and material worlds. It is a doctrine which exhibits a remarkable affinity to the neutral monism of American psychologists. And yet there is a difference between the two which is equally remarkable. Consciousness is in neutral monism not an entity but a function of the thought-stuff, a sort of phosphorescent activity which serves to light up its contour. The Sāṃkhya, however, sets up consciousness as an independent reality over against the principle that reveals itself in changes punctuated by space and time. Thus while the soul is being treated today as a theodic stop-gap which invites fuller enquiry into the nature of experience, it is, according to this system, the very fulness of reality in as much as it remains eternally the same. Revelation is its nature, and it always reveals. Other things wait on it for their expression, but it cannot be expressed in terms of any of them. So instead of being an abstraction from

the manifold of experience, it is the very condition of this experience, and as such it is concrete though necessarily transcendent.

It follows from the nature of consciousness that things are revealed by it as they really are, except in so far as the apparatus of thought fails to image them properly. This failure may be due to acquired bias or to temporary aberration or inactivity. But, broadly speaking, the apparatus functions well, and so things are what they appear to be. Western thought has so far regarded them as the ultimate but virtually unperceived causes of trains of physical and physiological changes which terminate in certain psychological facts. But its latest development seems to be an approximation to the Sāṅkhya view that the thoughts in us cannot be so very different from the objects outside us, forming as they do causally connected links of the same continuous chain of events.

The Sāṅkhya joins issue with Buddhism which questions the reality of the external

the essence in the case of phenomenal realities. They seek expression; to manifest themselves to consciousness is their nature, their existence (*Sattra*) being, indeed, inconceivable without such a revelation. Fulness of such existence, i.e. expression or explication unimpeded by any extraneous force is, when translated into the terms of our experience, joy. We do also picture it as such even when it is found in inanimate objects, while the specific forms in which it is best known to us are equanimity and contentment. But though the form which this principle takes necessarily varies with different types of existence, it is co-extensive with the phenomenal world." We have it in the blaze of fire and again in the easy and instantaneous comprehension of external objects by our senses. It is brilliance and buoyancy because it is life.

ing itself in its true character of revelation of fact. In the world of matter, again, you have it as obstacles to movement, drags on energy or checks to explication. Things which are heavy or opaque or lacking in well-defined features bear testimony to it, while in our emotional nature it takes the various forms of indifference and distaste for knowledge and activity. If alertness is the distinguishing feature of the first principle, this may be characterised as stolid apathy or whatever may correspond to it in the physical world.

But principles so antagonistic in their nature must either hold aloof or destroy each other. What is it then that brings them into effective relation, a relation, that is, which results in the ceaseless flow of life and change? It is a third principle, the tendency to movement, the pressure or urgency of force to express itself in effects. While rendering the obstacles operative, it gives to the essence of things the energy needed for overcoming them. And this it does in varying degrees and at different stages of combination, thus giving rise to an endless variety of forms. In the human mind it takes the form of dissatisfaction with the present and an irrepressible longing for a better and fuller life. The multiplicity of desires comes under it. But whatever its exact nature may be, it is felt as pain in so far

as it is a conscious impetus to movement and change.

These three principles constitute by their mutual actions the totality of phenomenal existence. They are opposed, indeed, to one another ; but their antipathy is the very condition of system, law and order, *i.e.* of the evolution of a cosmos.² Let us take homely examples to bring out the truth that there is in this paradox. The nature of fire is to burn. But its blaze would envelop all space and occupy all time had this nature free play. Hence the obstacles, destructive though they may seem, keep it in measure, regulate it so that it may form part of a system in which there is room for endless variety of agencies or substances. Our desires, again, crave many of them immediate satisfaction. But they have to contend against obstacles, which render life full of vicissitudes and, even where it is exceptionally successful, make it a matter of progress by stages. And of life other than this, of life which is not mingled sunshine and shadow, we have no knowledge, nor can we form any definite conception.

So these three principles build up, according to their apparent antipathy, the totality

fabric of the universe and provide therein for the varied experience of the soul. They have been called strands of the rope which binds the latter. And their fitness for combined activity leading to definite results has been aptly compared to the adjustment of the parts of a lamp for the production of a certain effect. Pour oil on the flame and you extinguish it. Throw the wick into the fire and it is burnt up. But when properly disposed, the oil is sucked up by the wick to yield a bright light. Thus in spite of their patent hostility, they combine to produce a desirable effect.

It is possible to imagine a state in which, like the wrongly arranged constituents of a lamp, these principles may overpower one another. But that is not the way to a cosmos in which objects act upon one another not at random nor for a strenuous sterility but in obedience to certain regulations and with a view to some common goal or end. Thus without some sort of scheme working within their nature or dominating them from outside they could not build up and maintain the world of mind and matter. They arrange and rearrange themselves ceaselessly in simple and complex forms of endless variety ; they invest these forms with a quasi-independence and connect them at the same time with a network of relations. But all their movements indi-

rolling lines of activity and a far-off goal which lends a meaning to every stage in progress. The unity that they exhibit is, as both dynamic and ideal.

The Sāṅkhya does not say that the primeval function is consciously directing willing wills when acting in unison. Purposeful activity seems, indeed, to imply an informing spirit that forces its way to ends which, however remote, are more or less clearly foreseen. To purpose, however, or end as exhibited by these forces a different concept is given in order to dissociate it from consciousness. And the Sāṅkhya beautifully illustrates this sense when it says that the fruit is the end of the fruit tree and the flower of the flowering plant, and that whatever stands in the way of such a consummation of their activities frustrates their purpose.

But let us examine this illustration carefully in order to find out all that is implied in it. The fruit and the flower are ends to be

force. But it naturally stops there, while the Sāṃkhya tries to complete the explanation by representing the cosmic process as both teleological and dynamic. Nature appears to science as threading dark ways and accidentally lighting upon order and development. But according to this system an everlasting purpose embraces all its movements though it is not recognised as such.

But is this final cause imposed on nature from above? Should we postulate a ruler fitted to guide it to some far-off divine event? And should we complete the theory by regarding him as the creator as well as the administrator of nature? If, however, this god is free as he ought to be, then he can have no desire and no limiting consciousness of self as distinct from what is beyond it. But desire and self-consciousness are required for the work of creation. If, on the other hand, he is bound, he cannot have that plenitude of power and wisdom which is needed for the creation and government of nature.⁵

Yet as nature is unconscious, it would seem to require the moving and regulating force of a conscious will.⁶ The Sāṃkhya sets down, however, a view like this to confusion about the respective provinces of consciousness

⁵ *Īśvara* is not a personal deity.

⁶ *Īśvara* is not a personal deity.

and the forces that are operative in nature. Agency does not belong to the former, nor, indeed, any sense of imperfection or want in which activities must originate. But the fidelity with which the activities of nature are reflected in it combined with the circumstance that these activities find their completion and sufficient reason in its experience lends colour to the supposition that it supplies the impelling force to nature and controls at the same time all its movements.² These movements are, indeed, inconceivable unless we relate them to consciousness, so that here in a sense they seem to have their origin as well as consummation. But it would be incorrect, according to the Sāṃkhya, to attribute to consciousness the purposive effecting of change on this account or to deny self-determination and completeness to nature. All that is implied is that there is behind the universe no random creative impulse but something which is quite definite in operation and productive, therefore, of effects that exhibit an intelligible relation to one another and to what is outside them.

does not exert a perceptible force on the bit of iron which moves towards it from a distance. The soul also has no direct connection with the activities of nature, though these converge towards its enjoyment. And if it seems to move it is because there is a false identification with the thought processes which appear transfigured in its light. This illusion is not unlike a familiar experience. Move a mirror in which a human form is reflected, and the latter, though stationary, will seem to move with it. Similarly consciousness, though pervasive and immutable, seems to share in all the mutations of the thought-elements, which are aglow with its brilliance.

But is it only a case of seeming? Why then does not the corpse eat and work? Are we not justified in inferring from its inability a causal relation between consciousness and activity? No, it is the individual, the bundle of desires and purposes, of habits and tendencies, enlivened and, indeed, transformed by the magic touch of consciousness that works. But however transformed, it is still a part of nature which serves the impersonal consciousness—proximately through it and remotely through other objects.

For this fitness of nature for the service of

the soul, no reasons are given. The fact is there : it is presumably an immanent teleology, a perpetual harmony in no way dependent on a conscious will. The unobtrusive appearance of milk in the cow for the sake of the calf furnishes a good parallel in a limited sphere. But while the cow renders service of a particular kind only to the calf, the services which the soul gets from nature are infinite in variety and so may be likened to the manifold ways in which a trained servant renders himself useful to his master. And as regards the duration of this service, it must last till all souls, infinite as they are in number, rise above the mist of ignorance and delusion and come to their own again. So the cosmic dance is compared to the performance of an artiste who exhibits her art so long as it continues to attract and amuse those who are being entertained. This is, indeed, a striking way of enunciating the important truth that we perceive only what interests us and can, therefore, form no conception of a world unrelated to our interests.

him and again to a modest matron who keeps aloof from the way of an intruder after she has once inadvertently crossed his path. Thus by similitude and parable the Sāṃkhya punctuates the doctrine that the soul's interest in nature is impermanent because it is based on confusion and that nature functions so long as this interest lasts while it sinks into quietude when interest is replaced by indifference.

Nature is like the soul without beginning or cause as it is impossible to assign a date, however distant, to the origin of their connection with each other. But unlike the soul which is eternally the same, nature is becoming, it is continual activity, if not continual change. Its eventful history is marked, indeed, by spells of apparent repose in which its infinite achievements lapse into mere potentialities. But even in these eventless intervals there is no lack of effort or tension. All becoming is a disturbance of equipoise, and as such it attracts attention. In the maintenance, however, of equilibrium, equal energy is needed, there is an equal expenditure of effort though naturally this passes unnoticed. The Sāṃkhya characterises and explains the distinction between them when it says that there is evolution of similars in states of motionlessness and of apparent collapse owing to the cir-

cumstance that the contending forces are able to maintain their respective grounds, while in spells of creative activity change follows change because the balance is turned in favour of one constituent force at one moment and of another at the next.⁶ They meet in order that they may struggle, and the ferment of this tussle is what constitutes actuality and life.

Such is, indeed, the cosmic process. And yet it is evolution because its course is not arbitrary or irregular but is governed throughout by an immanent idea that brings about the emergence of various orders of existence. It may not be possible for us to discover and explain the working of the idea all along the mobile and sinuous contour of reality. Over-shadowing doubt and even impenetrable darkness may rest on portions of it because our vision is limited. Yet the reflective mind discerns everywhere traces of striving after an ever-present object in the paths that are followed by evolution.

integration is the beginning of another beginning and not of the end. For from this state there is a fresh spring, a fresh development. The curtain rises once more and a new act is started, the drama being interminable as the dramatic personæ are countless. Or to change the figure, the gorgeous tissue of the universe unveils itself, so that its raw materials may serve for the expression of a new design, a modified pattern dictated by the type of experience that is just over. Thus the succession of evolution and disintegration has never had a beginning and will never come to a close.

Let us look even more closely into the phases of explication and potentiality which are said to belong to nature. In the former there is differentiation in what was originally undifferentiated. Thus the indeterminate acquires definiteness and system comes to bind what was before without order and coherence. The necessary material and force have always been there : but the change is effected under the stress of the controlling idea or of principles derived from it. And the same idea dictates the resolution of the cosmos by a reverse process when its possibilities are exhausted, so that the stage may be cleared for the materialisation of other possibilities.

What then is this substance which is not merely plastic but has in itself the force to

whose stress it submits and the idea in accordance with which it is pressed into shape? Is it something in addition to the three principles which are operative throughout the universe? Are we to regard them as working in conjunction with this substance? Such a supposition is hardly necessary, for they are competent for the production of all that has happened or may happen, while any single substance cannot by itself originate the endless variety of sights and sounds that greet us on every side. And there is no point in postulating a substance in which they inhere as so many qualities, when our study of the universe reveals them and them alone.⁶²

To appreciate this position it is necessary to bear in mind that the Sāṃkhya makes no mystery about our perception of the external world by positing imperceptible and hence hypothetical substances behind the qualities that are directly perceived. Things are what they appear to be. It follows that qualities and objects are identical and that their diverse forms are due to the diverse ways in which the original principles are combining in them.

Does the Sāṁkhya commit the double mistake of abstraction and generalisation in thus attributing the cosmos to their operation alone. Reflective analysis, it may be said, discovers them at work in every corner of creation while it fails to catch a glimpse of anything else. And it may be further urged that modern physics, with its improved methods of research, records its decision in favour of such a view when it practically dematerialises matter by denying solidity to it and resolving it into systems of radiation. But the world of science is necessarily abstract, and philosophy must dig elsewhere for its foundations in order that it may be close to nature and its concreteness. There is, indeed, not much to be said against the view that resolves the cosmos into expression, movement and strife. But this cannot be taken as the last satisfying explanation of existence, as the question still remains, — what it is that seeks expression and in seeking it submits to movement in order that it may overcome its limitations.

The Sāṁkhya arrives at the conclusion of modern science from a different standpoint, which appears, however, to be quite legitimate in view of the fundamental unity of matter, life and mind. It takes ideas and finds them in a state of ceaseless flux from their origin in other ideas to their disappearance in yet

others. So it concludes that movement or mutation is in their nature, though they must involve beside this dynamic principle, their typical form as the static centre and their setting or field which gives to that form its peculiar expression, its local and temporal colouring.

Could we conceive the principles as holding one another in such perfect balance as would neutralise their respective characters and preclude thereby the appearance of determinate forms of existence, such a state might be regarded as the logical antecedent of the cosmic process with which we are familiar. But the Sāṃkhya repeatedly observes that this process never had a beginning. So it does not assume that a state of equilibrium actually preceded the multifarious grouping of the principles in unequal measures which makes up this process. An apparently static condition intervenes, it is true, between periods of obvious stress and mutation. But this apparent repose only disguises the germ of subsequent activity and is like the calmness of

it. Thus there appears to be no warrant for assigning priority in respect of time or even reality in the ordinary sense to this static condition.

Yet such an assumption is necessary in a sense, because the mind cannot rest without separating the perpetually intermingled tendencies and contemplating them in the simplicity of such an equipoise. This simplicity cannot, indeed, be an object of experience ; it is beyond the reach even of imaginative thought. But it is presupposed in every act of experience and may be defined as what is ultimate in our analysis of it. For as we resolve facts into laws or forces, the solid actuality of the world fades away, its many-sided movements and Protean transformations merge into potentialities, and we are left in the presence of certain ultimate principles in an almost inconceivable state of repose. This pure potentiality is nature *par excellence*, *Prakṛiti* or the normal state, the mother or *raison d'être*, if not the antecedent condition, of the all-embracing process in which we find ourselves.⁴³

This cosmic process starts with the evolution of the power of comprehension and control, if that can be said to start which never had a beginning. The Sāṃkhya gives to it

a name which, when used in common parlance, is equivalent to intelligence. But surely it cannot be at this stage that 'large discourse, that capacity for looking before and after' to which man owes his pre-eminence in this world. It must be intelligence in embryo, not unlike the principle of co-ordination and adjustment which is the central fact of organisms. The commentators define it as strain or effort leading to definite results and they do it in terms and by examples that suggest judgment and resolution as its analogues in developed mental life. So in view of the difficulty of finding a suitable name for activity of this type in different grades of existence and of its affinity to well-known processes in our own, it may not inappropriately be called thought.

The beginnings of thought, thus understood, go right down into the world of automatic response to stimuli by means of which a living object takes what agrees with its growth and rejects what it cannot assimilate. In its highest form, it is essentially intelligent.

of the object. When taken in this comprehensive sense, it appears to have been present from the very beginning of life, and where that beginning was it is impossible to say. But the *Sāmkhya* seems to take it in a sense even more comprehensive so as to include the fundamental plan or scheme, the underlying idea which is affianced to energy and unfolded in the cosmos.

The next stage in evolution is the appearance of individuality which is a more complex product and at the same time more definite in character than the faculty of coordination and control wherein it originates. Individuality of a sort belongs even to cells, the lowest forms of organism, because their parts function together for the whole and strive to maintain it intact. But as exhibited in them, it appears to be no more than responsiveness to a central pressure which somehow controls each part for the well-being of the rest. Hence life in organisms is characterised by modern science as blind. But the *Sāmkhya* holds that even in them it involves some sense of integrity which serves to bind together quasi-psychical states into self-determining and self-conscious beings. This unity is really the unity of consciousness but is ascribed to them because they are yoked in its service and stand transformed in its light. Complete self-hood or personality is not, in-

deed, achieved at this stage and is probably never achieved in creatures below the level of man. But even in the lowest among them it is more than a mere central regulation of parts, for the condition in which this synthesis is achieved and the purpose which it is calculated to serve make it approach self-consciousness in some slight measure at least."

In making thought bourgeois into individuality before it ripens as experience, the *Sāṃkhya* seems to meet the obvious objection that to thought alone we cannot attribute causal activity or even existence. Yes, it exists only as the thought of a thinker, and this system stresses the point when it states that in every item of experience it is the individual who acts or suffers. But while recognising that thought centres round self-consciousness, it gives the precedence to the former because the organised and persistent object known as the self, which takes charge of experience, is itself the product of thought."

The next stage is the outcome of a divergent explication of individuality which results in the appearance of the senses and of their objects in the most elemental forms. The

latter, again, undergo a fresh course of development which completes the evolution by giving us the variegated world of sights and sounds and other sensations. It is taken cognisance of by five of the senses and reacted on by five others, while the eleventh which presides over them combines the impressions received from outside for the operations of thought and individuality and moves the five active senses in correspondence with these operations.⁴⁵ Thus are the dissimilar evolutes of individuality ultimately integrated, the resulting synthesis being infinitely elaborate owing to the cleavage involved in perception and desire.

This order of evolution, it may be objected, is the very reverse of what is revealed by an analysis of perception and related activities. For analysis discloses impressions on our senses from an already existent world and their co-ordination into percepts to be anterior to thought and to the development of the self-concept. But two things appear to be overlooked in a criticism of this type. The Śākhya has in view the logical and not the temporal order of mental facts in the full-orbed

activity of cognition. And even as an account of the temporal order, its statement is found to have no small measure of correctness if the early beginnings of thought as exemplified in our own lives are reviewed. There is, for instance, no dramatic suddenness in the appeal of the external world to our senses on our waking up after long hours of deep sleep. The return of consciousness is gradual like the return of light, commencing as it does with a vague, very vague sense of existence, which blossoms into self-consciousness and then into a clear realisation of the environment of sight and sounds.

What comes first in each of us is, in fact, thought or feeling, which does not yet recognise the distinction between subject and object, between itself and its content. But in spite of its non-relational character, it contains the possibility of an indefinite amount of difference, of a variety of aspects. And that

deriving them from matter and suggests in support of this view that if the world were reducible to mere atoms, there could be no place in it for vital impulse and psychic activity as the effect might not include what was not already in the cause.

Here probably do we get the first comprehensive and consistent theory of evolution. The world was not hammered into shape out of refractory materials by a perfect architect. It developed naturally and even necessarily by well-marked stages out of primordial elements and is developing still but without any intervention from outside. Such is the view of the *Sāṃkhya*, and it is one which evolutionists of every shade give their assent to.

But there are certain features of this view which strike one as peculiar. It is not the origin of species out of a parent genus that the *Sāṃkhya* tries to describe and account for. Its efforts are directed towards explaining the most general facts and forces of existence and in this explanation there is no room for accidental variations, a purpose being assumed to dominate the process in all its details. It goes on for the sake of consciousness and through the never-recessing activity of thought in which it originates. Thought as operative in its earliest stages is not, indeed, clearly defined. But probably it will be always difficult to define its

dim beginnings. The etymology, however, of the Sanskrit name suggests that the first stirrings of life are indicated by it, for the name comes from a verbal root which means 'to awake.'

The line of march is thus from the inarticulate beginnings of thought to the very determinate factors that are involved in perception. Evolution does not, indeed, cease with the first appearance of these factors, for the world of experience changes from hour to hour and develops into more and more complex form marked by the appearance of new attributes. But the change is never so revolutionary as to bring into existence a fresh stage in which the elements of the material world are no longer recognisable. When self-consciousness is first

too that experience should sometimes cease. Thus phases of potentiality alternate with phases of explication in the life-history of nature. But as explication can have no meaning except with reference to consciousness, the passage to it from potentiality involves the creation of an apparatus for destroying the aloofness of the soul. In fact, according to the Sākhya, nature achieves almost every thing in constructing this apparatus, for it not only links up the unchanging subject with the restless flux of phenomena but provides also the materials for this ever-changing show.

This apparatus is known as the subtle body, and it is composed of thought, individuality, the senses and the seminal principle of the material world in the form of rudiments of sensations. In thought, again, lie preserved tendencies and traces of previous impressions, which serve to determine the course of subsequent development. Thus nature furnishes both law and impulse in creating the subtle body. And it is able to interest the soul because thought in which the rest of the subtle body originates is not averse to consciousness. It seeks revelation, while the nature of the soul is to reveal. It is the effort to grasp the essence of things, and this essence or ideal form is fit to receive the light of consciousness. There is, therefore, an ingrained fitness, a

constant harmony between the two which serves to relate the last and farthest reach of evolution to the soul.

This subtle body, which has been always with the soul, encloses itself in a gross and perishable sheath composed of one or more elements for purposes of experience." And when a particular set of experiences conditioned by the desires and dispositions of a previous existence is completed, it shuffles off the mortal coil to adopt another suited to a fresh set which is necessitated by what it has just done and suffered. Thus 'the clockwork of incarnation' winds itself up every time it runs down till discrimination comes to liberate from the shackles of this tough world the soul which unwittingly shares the fortunes of the subtle body. But before that it may have to pass through every order of existence from the lowest organism to the most exalted among spiritual beings because experience is varied and the consequent desires and dispositions no less so.

The centrality of thought and individuality is, of course, asserted in all the orders of life. Experience must be lived with and not thought even if life could be lived without it.

insentient life would slip by without a realisation of its nature. But the Sāmkhya goes further and observes that vitality is a consequence of the functioning of the intellectual powers.⁴³ And modern science seems to subscribe to such a view when it finds co-ordination and adjustment in harmony with a persistent character even in the meanest organisms. But it assumes the possibility of thought and will of the kind implied in such activity without consciousness on the ground that these organic structures appear to work blindly to maintain themselves. The Sāmkhya avoids, however, such a position when it asserts that they function always for the sake of consciousness and appear perpetually transfigured in its light, so that we have no knowledge of what they might be without such transmuting influence, though it is an error to identify them, limited and mutable as they are, with the unchanging principle of consciousness.

It is difficult to reject summarily the opinion of the Sāmkhya on the pervasiveness of sensibility in the world.⁴⁴ Modern science does, indeed, draw a broad line between sentient life and that which appears to be insentient. But in doing so it has to accept the

disconcerting theory of an abrupt change in nature which it must explain or give up otherwise its first presupposition of the rule of system and law in the universe. Besides, there is nothing in physical science to warrant the inference that the intrinsic character of incoherent organisms must differ from that of the animal kingdom, while their analogous behaviour in certain circumstances would seem to indicate some measure of similarity in their inner working. Thus from whichever side we approach the problem, we seem to be in sight of the conclusion that mental and physical events form one connected whole wherever there is life, though they cooperate in varying degrees to evolve its various forms.

supplies also the principle of their development, must we not look upon it as formative and progressive according to ideas? How, indeed, without such an equipment of immanent ideas, could it build up and sustain the world of experience? And what, after all, is this world of experience but the outcome of elements which, when examined, are found to be rudimentary sensations? So are not the links psychical from one end of the chain of phenomena to the other, consisting as they do of thought and its various forms? And when we come to scrutinise the materials of which these links are made, are we not told that they consist of three principles which have well-marked emotional aspects, since the essence of things undeterred by obstacles in its expression is the embodiment of joy, the plastic stress which makes them change their forms incessantly originates in and throughout involves pain, while the obstacles that have to be overcome induce indifference and are from the idealist's view-point dulness or heaviness?

There is, therefore, ample ground for characterising the Sāmkhya as a form of idealism. But it asserts at the same time the reality of the external world or, in other words, the concreteness of the object as furnishing the occasion and determining the character of experience. And in the forms and features of

this world, it notices a fixity unknown to the flux of ideas, while to the energy underlying them it assigns an external and resistless might. In fact, as even thought and individuality are but expressions of this energy, it is always alive to the littleness of man as composed of them when contrasted with the baffling infinitude of his environment. This environment, again, is not only independent of him, but is perceived as it is, so that instead of taking its form in the mould of his perception, it claims its share in moulding him so far as he is bound by time and space. The *Sāṃkhya* repudiates, therefore, subjectivism of the type, which, reduces the external world to collocations of mental facts momentary in duration and more or less arbitrary in their origin. And it would mark itself off from idealism by observing that purposive activity does not always involve the presence of conscious purpose and that the possibilities of sensations are not to be confounded with sensations as they figure in our life.

thought as the source of the manifold world of sense, which is subsequently taken cognisance of by particular and separate thought-groups. But this is a concession to their theistic creeds which they cannot reconcile with the general trend of their speculations. For thought, according to these speculations, originates and functions only for the sake of consciousness and is never known to function and develop into more elaborate forms except when transmuted in its light, while consciousness is always particular, and its subtle body, in which are the germs of the material world, is no less so. Besides, this material world and all its shows vanish into nothingness as soon as the soul which has so far taken cognisance of it gains deliverance. Other souls may still have need of a 'material world', and so it may exist for them. But if all souls could be free, it would disappear leaving no vestige of its materiality behind. Thus the only sense in which it may be spoken of as the product of cosmical thought is that the broad lines of the evolution of which it is the final reach are in every case the same, though its essence must always consist in perception by this or that individual.

Still as an important development of the system, this interpretation merits a careful study. Its advocates join issue with the Buddhists in asserting that the individual

mind cannot be regarded as constructing its object-world as though *ab initio*. Mere sensations are, of course, transient and individual, but they are elaborated and fixed in like relations by all minds, the relations being, in fact, the laws and principles in accordance with which they must be experienced by different individuals. These laws and categories are the universals of thought, and in them and not in fleeting sense-impressions must we look for the true foundations of the world. Its fixity and externality are due, therefore, to the circumstance that they create a system which is altogether independent of our individual activities. The logic of the universe is thus the logic of cosmical thought.

But if thought is one and entire at the outset, how comes it to be many and varied at a later stage of development? The conditions to which it is attached are absolutely different, so that the diversity cannot be a mere question of differences in their nature. Their plurality

experiences are only the Proteus-like disguises of one and the same thought, its omnipotence consisting in infinite possibility? And may we not attribute their apparent isolation and independence to a defect inseparable from finitude which makes the universal appear as many and loses sight of its perfection as a whole in taking account of the inevitable imperfection of details and parts?

Unless we resolve everything in this way into a cosmical process determined by cosmical thought, there appears to be no escape from subjectivism of a kind along the line followed by the Sāmkhya. For as this system has it, thought splits up first into countless individuals to match the countless souls that are there. And the evolution of the material world is a subsequent stage of development, so that it is more directly connected with the separate personalities than with cosmical thought. It follows that each of them has a world of its own to live and work in. And even then the problem remains unsolved,—how they should differ in respect of experience in spite of the absolute similarity of the souls for whom it is meant. The mere multiplicity of these souls cannot be accepted as a sufficient explanation so long as they are regarded as perfectly alike. And hence the explanation has to be sought in the nature of thought itself,

in its insistence and emphasis on variety of every type as a condition of its activity.

If, again, the world, with its hard and rigid outlines, is not merely the product of thought, but is thought in every grain of it, and if thought itself is unknown except in the character which it receives from consciousness, can it be consistently maintained that thought or nature in which it originates is quite independent of consciousness? Or does it not amount to a recognition of the fundamental importance of consciousness as a factor in the shaping of the universe? Let us see what this independence of nature amounts to. It is said to be without beginning like the soul, but that is because there never was a time when the soul did not stand in need of experience by which alone in point of fact it could work out its destiny. It is said also to be without end, but only because there are countless souls to be saved which cannot be done in less than endless time. Thus the independence that is claimed for nature is not absolute in the matter

grandest product is thought, of which, indeed, its other creations are only modified forms. But there is a strange affinity between thought and consciousness, a sympathy incomprehensible but strong enough to bring together entities so irreconcilable as the unchanging soul and the changeful material world.

In making thought the product of nature and yet akin to consciousness, the Sámkhya appears to some to be on the threshold of a legitimate explanation. And that explanation is that the nature which expresses itself in thought is not outside the sphere of consciousness. But it is unacceptable to the system because restless, ever-changing thought and its fleeting products spell misery, if not to-day, at any rate to-morrow. They make up the vicissitudes of life which can never commend themselves to wisdom. And deliverance from these vicissitudes must be out of the question if thought is within consciousness. The Sámkhya believes in deliverance and so stresses the distinction between the immutable soul and the perpetually changing thoughts and facts of the phenomenal world. It is an important distinction from the viewpoint of ethics. But this system probably carries it too far in ascribing to the soul and to nature too an apparently impossible absoluteness.

As already observed, it recognises the intimacy of the relation between the self and the not-self. But it conceives the former as a link in the chain of cosmic forces, only differentiated from the rest of them by the circumstance that it shines with a loftier and lighter. That light is of the soul, of the transcendental ego that stands apart from the cosmic dance and yet by its mere presence starts the show. But does it merely furnish the occasion or the motive for the conversion of the dark, unconscious forces of nature into the conscious and the cognised? No, as already stated, its measureless and colourless radiance lights up the many coloured web of experience, thus investing it with a sense of individuality. Yet it is passive all the while though an original bias to be worked out by experience leads it to assume that it is the author of all that happens."

that account. But anyway the delusion is there, and it detracts from the rounded completeness of the soul, which is a fundamental principle of the Sámkhya. A similar incomprehensibility attaches to its theory of the infusion of consciousness into that which is essentially unconscious. The absorption of heat by pieces of metal is referred to by way of elucidation of the mystery. But there is no inherent antagonism between heat and the properties of metals as there is between consciousness and unconsciousness. And the Sámkhya expressly repudiates the possibility of a complete alteration of the nature of objects.

Thus both in its enunciation of the problem and in the solution which it offers, there is a clear though reluctant admission of some sort of affinity between the soul and the world as constituted by thought.⁵³ There is also the tacit recognition of progress as the condition of perfection and of experience as the *sine qua non* of this progress. We learn the lesson of life and revise our values when its treasures are found to be heavy with tears. But the lesson is not immediately learnt, nor can mere knowledge avail much, as the mockery of life comes home to us after a long course of disappointments. The Sámkhya re-

⁵³ B. N. and J. I. 142 and 143.

cognises, therefore, stages in our onward march, stages which cannot be skipped, and it holds that at each of these we are indebted for advance in the right direction to the world of experience or to nature of which it is the progressive outcome.

CHAPTER V.

DELIVERANCE.

All our troubles are said to originate in the identification of consciousness with thought which is the most ethereal of the products of nature. But how can they be mixed up? Thought as known to us is both activity and mutation, as there never was an idea which did not radiate energy or undergo modification at every moment of its existence. The Sāṅkhya assumes probably that thought in its most attenuated form, i.e. destitute as far as possible of sensuous and conceptual contents gets identified with the passive and limitless principle of consciousness. But thought, however rarefied, must have some measure of definiteness and some capacity for growth and decay. Unless, therefore, the Sāṅkhya concepts are revised, the confusion in which all our misery is said to originate appears to be inexplicable.

Even if this objection is waived, there still remains the possibility of confusion to be accounted for. Is not the immaculate soul above such a weakness? Or how can consciousness certify an error in spite of its purity and freedom from limitation and relate itself

on the strength of that error to what is radically different in character! To get over this difficulty, the Sāṃkhya starts an ingenious theory which secures the appearance of consistency for its explanation, but does not get over the real crux. Thought as illuminated by consciousness and not consciousness itself is, according to this theory, the parent and victim of the confusion.² It harbours the conviction that ideas and sentiments belong to the soul and that the soul initiates such movements as may be traced to the impelling force of desires. Thus it identifies its own cognitive and practical aspects with the soul which is no more than a passive witness of them. Still this confusion colours the soul as well as it becomes the experiencer of happiness and misery.³

of discrimination is made in drawing the line between itself and the soul.⁵⁶ When this has been done, thought refuses to be interested in the latter : the cosmic dance which has been maintained for its delight and edification⁵⁷ ceases, and thus freedom is attained by the removal of the phenomenal world.

The sanction, therefore, for the world-process as well as for its withdrawal comes from thought. Thought is credited with the control of the destiny of the soul, the soul owing to its passivity being incapable of governing thought. We must go a step farther and add that the corrected thought must abide with the soul as its Mentor to guard against the possibility of future lapses. Or if it is claimed that the original bias once removed, the soul remains ever after impervious to foreign influence, then the conclusion cannot be avoided that this reformed or regenerated soul is in a real sense the creation of thought.⁵⁷ Anyway the relation between the two is very intimate, and the Sāṃkhya stresses this relation though in its own way when it says that thought is ever true to the interest of the soul, works surely though blindly for it and rests from activity, thus virtually passing into nothing-

⁵⁶ G. and V, 27.

⁵⁷ U. E, III. 66 and 67 give the reasons for not apprehending a recurrence of the evil.

by side, while the notion of continuity is involved alike in the self-concept and the idea of our phenomenal existence.

Yet fairness demands the statement that there are important arguments in favour of the contention of the Sāmkhya that the soul is different even from its thoughts. Introspection seems to vouch for an abiding and changeless entity in the background of the perpetually varied show of ideas, feelings and desires. Such a twofold testimony appears, in fact, to be implied in the very act of introspection as its possibility depends on the presence of a witness of the changing continuum which is sometimes designated the stream of consciousness. Besides, if thought is the assertion of the object in ideal form, then it appears to govern or limit consciousness as it were from outside instead of being a phase of the latter. Religion also assumes a stable principle behind the flux of psychic events, and ethics where it leans on theology makes the same assumption in its doctrine of moral responsibility. The Sāmkhya goes only a step farther when it bases its doctrine of absolute dissimilarity between the soul and its so-called states on the conviction that the soul seeks deliverance from them.

To understand what this deliverance may be, we require to know clearly wherein our

form of impressions and tendencies. And what becomes potential in this way blossoms forth in idea, sentiment and activity when the circumstances are ripe for such an explication. Thus the past leans over the present, which, again, when joining the past, casts its deep and broad shadow over the future. So it must have ever been and so it will always be. For the peculiar bent of our minds even in childhood indicates that we bring our prenatal dispositions with us. And we have no reason for assuming that the domination of the past must cease as soon as the present existence comes to an end. The swiftest grey-hound cannot outrun its shadow.

All this, however, is in a sense on the physical plane, for desires and dispositions are quite as physical as actions and their consequences. They are, in fact, the seeds of life, and they burgeon into perceptible forms when the circumstances are suited to such a growth, just as seeds in the vegetable world shoot out in the proper season in a congenial soil.¹ And when they have unfolded all that was latent in them, they die, but in dying they leave their impressions on thought, enriched or modified by the circumstances in

¹ On the part played by dispositions and on the manner in which they impregnate thought see V, 35 and V and G, 32.

which they have expressed themselves. These impressions, again, develop in due season, so that the interdependence of potentiality and explication, like that of seed and growth, appears to be without beginning and without end.

Death cannot shatter the structure which forms the basis of this alternate growth and decay. For though it dissolves the body that is perceptible by the senses, it leaves intact the subtler sheath which has thought as its core. In this thought lie imbedded all tendencies and desires, and out of it are evolved events and objects. Thus death, instead of releasing the future from the tyranny of the past and the present, only opens a new chapter in the history of determination by enabling thought to build up a new sensitive basis for the receipt of impressions and the transmutation of energy and a new world where fresh impressions may come and to which energy may flow.

the same vital principle may pass through different orders of existence and inhabit different worlds in succession. It may clothe itself in the form of a god or a man or a beast according as serene purity or restlessness or dulness becomes its dominant feature. There is, indeed, no more mystery in such transformation than there is in the growth of trees of different kinds from different classes of seeds.⁶¹

So the energy that is locked up in thought as tendency and desire must be equal to the creation not only of an organism for unfolding itself, but also of an environment suited to it. The Sāmkhya does, indeed, speak of a universe common to all and of divisions of it occupied each by creatures that resemble one another. But the principles that form the keystone of the system point to the conclusion that each living creature is the architect of its world because it is the architect of its fate and that the infinity of worlds so constituted appear limited in number because the infinity of individuals that people them fall into a few more or less defined classes. Such in logical strictness should be the doctrine of the Sāmkhya. But it is nowhere definitely expressed, while there are many passages which refer to a general unfolding of the universe.

But whatever may be the relation of the process to individual consciousness, the life-history of every creature is, of course, directly and intimately connected with its outer or corporeal than its gross body or organic structure. For ripples in thought are caused by disturbances in this visible framework, and the ripples alone emerge as conscious states or elements of experience. It follows, that the soul cannot expect complete deliverance so long as it is encumbered with such a framework. And a framework of some sort it is bound to have unless there is a cessation of the creative activity of thought or rather of the tendencies and impressions that are being laid up in it. These continue, however, to be active till the possibility disappears of their being felt. Their strength lies in their potentiality, and so if they drop entirely out of consciousness they must pass out of existence too.

is accomplished, thought rests from its labours and consciousness ceases in consequence to reflect the countless differences that make up the world.

But can this deliverance be expedited? Yes, the process is long because the traces of activities prompted by indiscrimination persist in thought and induce similar activities in their turn, new experiences coming thus at the call of the old ones. It is a vicious circle; but the fatal defect can be got rid of by rising above the refracting medium of error and ignorance and weeding out the notions and feelings that flourish in it. The task is, of course, of enormous difficulty, for these ideas and emotions or the tendencies in which they originate are the embodiments of creative energy and they are continually pressing against the portals of consciousness. At the same time nothing is simpler in a sense, for all that is required is a change of view-point, though long ages are generally required for achieving it because long ages have made persistence in error a matter of habit with thought.

And this process is not merely long; it is attended with much suffering, for at every forward step some cherished illusion has painfully to die. Here it is that philosophy can help us materially, as philosophy is the con-

concentrated light of reason employed in sitting appearance from reality. The *Siddhanta* holds that even in matters spiritual, reason or philosophy must be the supreme judge, and that it cannot resign its office to faith or delegate its authority to feeling. But by philosophy it understands not merely a speculative conjecture about the destiny of man, but a reason and abiding conviction which profoundly affects character and emerges as intense exertion of the will. To such a reason I wish, to such a shaping and rational idea, we may very well turn for guidance and support in the blind and baffling twilight of plausibility.

There is, indeed, in every human being the feeling for reality, the longing for deliverance from the allurement of the unreal or the transitory or rather of the adventuresome. But the feeling is confused though honest, it is weak though substantially correct. He who trusts to it, may have made many steps off the straight road as well as on it. He has also wasted much time in merely doubting and hesitating. And by abstractions and speculations he has diverted the power of his mind from the

long, strenuous and disheartening pilgrimage. What is needed, therefore, is that the distinction implied in the feeling should be made explicit. It is clear knowledge that is required to rescue thought from the predicament of a man who is feeling his way with difficulty and doubt in a gusty night.

But once this object is achieved, thought is no longer ruffled by emotional stirrings and so gains a serenity unknown to it before. Hence consciousness ceases to be distracted by the panoramic view which thought has provided for it with a fatal facility. It is like emergence from a turbid medium or attainment of normality after submission to conditions more or less abnormal.⁶⁴ There is no question here of moral progress in the ordinary acceptation of the term. The health of the soul was at stake owing to infection, and that is ultimately safeguarded. Its existence was so far one long trouble; it was the victim of a ceaselessly oppressive nightmare. From that nightmare it rises to realise itself and to avoid thenceforth even the shadow of foreign influence.

It should be noted that the conceptions of popular morality have no place in the *Sāṃkhya*. Of divinely appointed rewards and

⁶⁴ *A and V. E.*, II 34, 35.

penalties of virtue and vice. It leaves nothing
 In fact, it can find no room for anything in the
 causal nexus that is evident everywhere in
 thought. Moreover, while it states an
 axiomatic truth that good deeds lead to
 happiness, it does not assign to any type of
 goodness a result that would stultify our notion
 of correspondence between cause and effect.
 So though it draws no shadowy line between
 good and bad deeds, it ascribes not to the
 former but to thought the power of saving the
 soul.

a resolute application of our energy to what are generally regarded as important tasks, neither does it check and defeat our manhood, for in asking us to give up good things, it asks us to be strong against the strength of our rebellious passions and to curb the madness of our wills. When the prizes of life are abjured because they are hard to acquire or hard to retain, the resulting asceticism may be taken as indicative of poverty of spirit. But a different judgment must be passed when it is due to a marked change in the perspective and proportion of things, owing to which pleasures lose their power of appeal.⁶⁵ And such is the asceticism of the Sámkhya. It holds that the man of the world does not see life steadily or see it whole, and it rejects in consequence the remedies that he suggests for the evils that beset life, while it seeks in thought alone a way out of them because they are found to arise out of a persistent obliquity of vision.

But what is this thought? We know it only as lit up by consciousness and as serving its ends under the impression, mistaken though it be, that it is part and parcel of consciousness. A certain independence is claimed, indeed, for it at the conclusion of the show when it is disabused of this view. But with this disillusion-

⁶⁵ See V, 23 on the two kinds of dispassion.

ment, all activity ceases for it, though it is the principle of activity. It passes into rest and sleep. For what else is the serenity that is said to attain at the close of the drama but the rigidity, the numbness of death? It dies, is divorced from consciousness. One is, therefore, inclined to conclude that the view with which it started, the view, viz., that it belonged to consciousness was not so mistaken after all.

What, again, does the soul appear to be apart from this thought? It suffers without knowing why and is delivered without knowing how. And though it is said to preside over the whole show, its immediate proximity prevents it from approving or forbidding the show at any of its stages. Is not this, then, the pure light of consciousness, the mere mould or form of thought which is unimpaired without its content? And does not the soul thereby depart from the conception of reality which it makes thought and consciousness independent of one another in place of not being so?

come to be related among themselves. The fleeting and the permanent, the mutable and the changeless may be inseparably connected. But the one is not the other, and this is what the Sāmkhya asserts in its own way. •

Is this principle of permanence, this onlooker disclosed in introspection? The Sāmkhya seems disposed to this view when it refers to the universal and ineradicable faith in its existence. But it offers also proofs in support of this faith, and they go to show that this principle is the condition and not a differentiated aspect of intellectual and spiritual life.⁶ Hence its critics are not fair to it when they say that the disappearance of particular thoughts and feelings must mean the extinction of consciousness too. It holds as against Buddhism that consciousness is not the mere collocation of psychic states. It holds also that there is a way of knowing different from that of discriminative attention which deals with particular concepts and proceeds step by step from fact to fact. This other way of knowing is the way of consciousness which develops a universality of outlook when unfettered by thought.

Whatever may be thought of the distinction between soul and thought in this system,

there is nothing to shirk it in the manner that
 it lays down for those who would free themselves
 the limitations of life. This notion, which
 embodies one of the grandest thoughts of the
 human race, may be briefly stated as follows:
 Not in cheap or evasive form of a dis-
 tention to face the responsibilities of life is dis-
 vanced to be sought, but in the decision to
 face them squarely coupled, however, with the
 conviction that they cannot exhaust the mean-
 ing of existence for the imperishable soul. The
 calls of our respective stations have, indeed, to
 be attended to. But we cannot identify our

that goal is attained. And in place of them we may not expect the bright innocence of childhood or the wise serenity of age. This marvellous world, ringing and resplendent with the sounds and sights of existence will pass and leave not a trace behind. Thus the charm and solace that there are in beauty and melody will go, and along with them the superior charms of friendship, love and intercourse with fellow-creatures. But will the highly refined satisfaction that attends intellectual pursuits remain? No, this too must vanish. The measure, again, of our sunshine is said to be the brightness that we kindle in the eyes of others. But even the 'exquisite luxury of doing good' to others must become impossible in that state of isolated perfection. Is this a consummation to be desired and striven for? In seeking it do we not court the infinite sadness of being torn from all that we have prized? What are we to get in return for this discipline of pain and privation to which we are asked to submit?

These are considerations which will naturally occur to people who are inclined to paint life with purple patches, who retain intact their capacity for the enjoyment of surface values and instead of trying to probe the depths take their happiness as it comes. But this roseate picture of life has another side to

it. Youth, however brilliant, is a preparation for age, and life itself a preparation for death. And if the iron chain of necessity binds the moral world as it does the physical, we shall plunge again into the dreaded experience of the past, old apprehensions will reappear, old worries will regrow and we shall test repeatedly the bitterness of servitude and mortification; for these are the inevitable consequences of ignorance and weakness, which we cannot avoid in any form of limited life, however exalted. So its mockery must come home to us at last, and then we cannot help asking, is it worth while at all? We may, indeed, insist for a time on keeping on the sunny side of life. But despondency is bound to come, even to the happiest and most energetic among us.

excuse, therefore, for concluding that deliverance from it has the forbidding look of a doom.

It is, in fact, the sensuous mist enveloping us which blurs the prospect and prevents us from discovering at once the real nature of this life. Then there are the illusions of sentiment and self-consciousness. Even thought, relatively pure though it is, is misled and misleads us in consequence. For though the world originates in it, it stands demoralised and fascinated before this world as if the latter were an independent entity capable of deciding the fate of the soul. Thus the enchantments are laid on very thick, our little life from beginning to end being virtually thatched with them. It is not that the senses and the intellect report falsely about objects and events. But in turning our attention to the showy chaff before us, they obscure our nature and thus maintain the grand illusion which leads us to identify the soul with them and their interests.

Knowledge on this point is, therefore, the prime need, knowledge that will dispel fear and prevent misery by removing the illusion that the complexity and imperfection of mental processes are not foreign to the soul. When this knowledge comes to thought, when thought realises that the soul can have no genuine or abiding interest in the aspirations

and activities in which its plastic energy is manifested, it drops the curtain on the deceptive show which it has so far maintained and thus allows the soul the much-needed opportunity of turning its gaze inwards. And then a new knowledge appears as well as a new self which is different from the false self that acknowledges the impulsion of desires and mixes itself up with the rabble of the passions.⁶

spectator : it has observed all that has happened and will observe all that may take place. And yet it is said to appear afresh when its fancied connection with the world ceases, as before that a monstrous obliquity of vision⁶⁹ prevents it from realising its true nature.

The new knowledge too is radically unlike that which originates in thought. It embraces in one comprehensive vision what is abiding or real while the other is the perception of differences in a world of inexhaustible diversity. Hence while the former is complete and incapable of improvement from the very beginning, the latter is always piecemeal and provisional, and it grows by addition or supersession from day to day, so that it is as far as ever from attaining perfection.⁶⁹ The perpetual inadequacy of this knowledge follows from the nature of its subject-matter in the trackless variety of which thought is only too apt to lose its way. It follows also from the limited nature of thought owing to which the reasoning that was convincing yesterday is yielding today to a larger generalisation and will yield to one still wider to-morrow, so that with such volatile elements our conclusions are necessarily loose and floating. And they teach us to live and work

⁶⁹ See V, 23 for the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge.

for appearances and thus keep up the 'fictitious unprofitable' of which the world is full. It is quite otherwise, however, with true knowledge which is peace because it has nothing to do with fleeting forms, is above the tyranny of practical desires and takes as little account of the indefinite future as it does of the 'fixed and irrevocable past.'

But is such knowledge possible? Is it not a mere vanishing point obtained by elimination of contents from what must be varied and changing? Can reality in any sense be attributed to what is so characterless and abstract? Can there be awareness which is

for it. We cannot even describe it as we can the details of experience. But our intellectual activities, which are so partial and unsatisfactory even at their very best, suggest that 'the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world' will some day be lightened, not by piecing together fragmentary information, but by a complete insight into the nature of reality.⁷⁰ In fact, when our thought is carefully examined, it is found to presuppose an intelligent principle capable of such insight as its starting point and final goal.

But does not experience show us the way to salvation? Is it then to be eschewed?⁷¹ It may be partial, but it grows from more to more. Yet the abiding reality which gleams through it recedes from us as we press forward guided by its light. So it provides no permanent resting-place either here or hereafter. But does it not furnish opportunities for doing good and being good? Life gains in complexity as a result of experience, and advance in this direction marks and measures advance in morality, the simplest life being the least moral. Experience must include, indeed, suffering as well as enjoyment; but our moral fibre probably becomes the tougher for the occasional hurt. Besides, is it not by exercis-

⁷⁰ G, 65.

⁷¹ G and V, 60.

ignorance. therefore, of your true state that you have to shake off. an ignorance which spells weakness and misery.⁷² But it is only in the school of experience that you can learn how to do it, for experience alone can demonstrate the futility of hopes and fears, the inanity of joys and sorrows. This school-life, however, is only a transitional stage ; its lesson has to be learnt at last, and after that it has nothing else to give. So its purpose is defeated by your continuing in the school for ever.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION.

To deliver man from the trouble of life is the aim of Hindu systems of philosophy, life being taken as tormented by persistent fears or haunted by meaningless desires or at its best enlivened by foolish hopes and joys that cannot intervene the inevitable change of misery. And the remedy for this evil is found by each of them in the due and honest appreciation of a fundamental difference. But here they part company, for while the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika consider it to be the distinction between the real and the ideal, from the view-point of the Vedānta it is the distinction between the absolute and the individual, and of the Sākhya and the

fourth and fifth ascribe on the contrary reality though in varying degrees to whatever takes place as well as to its ultimate cause on the ground that effects or events in time are proximate or remote manifestations of it.

But since they hold misery to be the common lot of man, all of them are pessimistic in a sense. The Sāmkhya and the Vedānta in particular deny all real significance to ordinary human effort and refuse to take enjoyment at its face value but would regard it on the other hand as the gilded index of far-reaching mischief. Yet happiness, they maintain, is positive and not merely the realised absence of pain. And their outlook is not gloomy after all, as they promise a safe though necessarily distant haven out of the conflict and chaos of life. Hence endless suffering or annihilation is not with them as it is with the genuine pessimist the consummation of our striving and the final verdict upon our aspirations. They undertake, in fact, to guide us through the mist of ignorance in which fantastic and terrible shapes of hopes and fears rise up like spectres on every side to torture us. Knowledge, they say, is the prime need, and they identify it with purity and freedom when they declare it to be the passport to beatitude.

But in thus allowing precedence to knowledge, they do not take up a position which is

incompatible with a rational system of ethics. Of divinely appointed rewards for virtue and penalties for vice, they know, indeed, little. And they refuse to desire and sentiment the conspicuous place that is assigned to them in certain codes of morality. But they do not advocate the inanity of a narrow egotism; they enjoin passionlessness and detachment as a cure for the evils of life. There is, on the other hand, much to be said in favour of the doctrine that vice is the outcome of ignorance and error which create false interests and raise up a host of artificial passions. And if it is urged that even when the house of the intellect has been swept clean of false and narrow views, undisciplined passions may overpower it unless it is guarded by the usual moral law.

the root and rule of a truly moral life. The *Sāṃkhya*, in particular, preaches universal kindness when it condemns in no uncertain voice religious rites enjoined by the highest authority on the ground that they involve a carnival of slaughter of defenceless creatures. To gain abiding peace we must give it to all,—such is the thought which underlies its code of morality. And it asks us, therefore, never to blend our hopes and aspirations with the suffering of those animals which, by every plea of pity and claim of right, demand our protection. It deprecates also the offer of presents to priests in the expectation of attaining merit, though it values properly the instruction and society of holy men as aids to the higher life. A similar or rather greater efficacy is ascribed to the due performance of the tasks to which we are called by our place in society so that there is not the slightest excuse for the observation that it tends to divorce us from the wide world of human good. Moreover, while thus conceding to duty its rightful position in the economy of life, it draws a distinction that must form the basis of all sound ethical systems.

It is possible, according to the *Sāṃkhya*, to buy happiness with good deeds. But this happiness cannot last, and it is very different from that equanimity which the soul longs for

correctly and act conscientiously. Hence it is hard to find fault with the intellectualism of the Sāmkhya. But what strikes its critic and, in fact, repels him is its godlessness. If, however, it finds no room in the universe for a wise and beneficent ruler of it, it does not on that account abrogate the sacred duties which man owes to himself and to other creatures and which derive their obligatoriness from no extraneous sanction. All that it contends for is that of a world so full of misery, the God, if there be one, must be pain personified and then his worship must consist in suffering in silence and without hope. Such a doctrine, however, is unacceptable, and equally unacceptable is the view that he is static and lifeless and, therefore, unable to control the course of events. The system seeks, therefore, to account for them without the hypothesis of a creator or ordainer.⁷⁵

The keystone of the system is its theory of causality. Causes are, according to it, either material or efficient. The material cause supplies not only the stuff of which the effect is made, but the power also, the plastic energy, that gives to it its specific form and

⁷⁵ P. II. and A. V. 2—12 explain that the hypothesis is unnecessary as well as unacceptable and point out that even the Scriptures admit that there is no conclusive proof of the existence of God when they say that nature is competent for the production of everything that exists.

extraneous influence characterise it. At the same time it must resemble them in important respects, as there can be nothing in effects which was not previously in the cause. The principle of movement or mutation must, for instance, be a factor of it as objects and events appear to be in perpetual flux. But as change implies an antecedent state of repose or fixedness, alongside of the principle just mentioned there must be another which conserves or sets itself in opposition to movement. Moreover, since change and rest are inconceivable except in so far as they are perceived as contradictory states, there must be a third principle which reveals both of them to consciousness. These three make up, therefore, the unperceived and ultimate cause of whatever exists outside of us.

But when we turn our gaze inwards, we find the same principles once more. Man stands on the threshold of a marvellous world forged by them; but his connection with it is established by means of his intellectual senses, which thus embody in a conspicuous degree the principle of revelation. His active senses enable him to modify this world to suit his interests, and so they illustrate the principle of mutation or change, while the life-breath or vitality which persists in spite of change and movement and keeps the body in order is an equally remarkable illustration of the principle

for revelation or free and full expression is joyful, activity or movement causes pain, and whatever obstructs revelation or thwarts activity stuns or stupefies us to that extent. But since the effect is only a specific form of the cause, these feeling elements may be regarded as identical with the three principles, which for the sake of convenience have been termed nature.

The stress here laid on the emotional aspect of the manifold of sense and of the processes which take cognisance of it is significant, as it brings out better than anything else the anthropocentric character of the system. This feature appears also in its characterisation of the principal evolutes of nature. For though thought in some form or other is co-extensive with life, yet the operations ascribed to it belong to its most developed type as exhibited in man. It is defined as certainty or conviction expressing itself in activity, and its achievements are said to be correct judgment and clear decision leading to virtue, knowledge, transcendent powers and the philosophic temperament, while the opposite consequences appear when it is improperly used. Individuality, again, though it admits of obvious degrees and is in its lowest and commonest form only the co-ordination and control of parts for the conservation of a com-

tracted from it. While revealing everything that is capable of revelation, it remains necessarily in a 'blazing mist of vagueness', for what is there to reveal it? The Sanskrit text expresses this detachment by saying that the soul is a perpetual dweller in the cave.

There are important, though it may be partial, truths in the position taken up here. The Sāmkhya respects the general conviction that there is a world outside us in which events are so ordered as to justify anticipations and useful retrospects. And it dismisses with scorn the view that nothing exists beyond flashes of consciousness on the ground that such a pernicious doctrine robs life of all significance and runs counter to the most elementary experience.⁷⁹ So far it stands on firm ground, for the belief in an external world is not a speculative conjecture or scientific hypothesis about which doubt might be a duty till its truth is proved but a presupposition in every department of activity and reflection. It is, in fact, inevitable and as such independent of experience, so that those who criticise it in theory still live by it in practice. But while recognising the externality of the world, it undertakes to interpret the nature and import of that externality. And here too

⁷⁹ I, I. 42—47.

it is within its rights, for philosophy has always striven to explain the creed of common sense and to clear it of extraneousness.

But to discover the key to the explanation offered by the *Sāṃkhya* we have to read between the lines of the aphoristic text which gives us little more than the conclusions based on different trains of reasoning. The fact of these seems to be that ideas and objects possess so many points of contact as to rule entirely out of court the theory that they are independent though interacting entities. If, however, they are of the same stuff and are distinguished from one another only in respect of form, they must form parts of the same system for thought cannot be free if events and objects reflected in it are determined. It is clear

mental even in the case of things outside us, for analysis does not carry us further than sensations. They are ultimate facts, data or givens which we can neither explain nor get behind. And to assume that there are substances behind them is to indulge in an abstraction with which we can have no perceptual and, therefore, no real connection. Such must be the train of thought that makes the Sámkhya assert that the phenomenal world, whether mental or extramental, is composed of emotional elements. And yet with iterated emphasis does it state that they are unconscious, though unconscious feeling is a contradiction in terms. What is implied, therefore, is that they appear as feelings when lit up in their finer forms by the rays of consciousness. Strictly speaking, they are dark or unconscious, but even chaff and dust begin to sparkle when the light of the noon-day sun is on them. The Sámkhya, therefore, is not hopelessly obscure when it says that the world is composed of pleasure, pain and stupor. It is the current coin of philosophical discussion which is at fault because it fails to draw a distinction between feelings *in esse* and feelings *in posse*.

But the same logic which teaches the Sámkhya to class things and thoughts together on account of their intimate relationship

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee. The names are written in a cursive hand, and the addresses are written in a printed hand. The list is organized in two columns, with names on the left and addresses on the right. The names are: John A. Smith, James B. Jones, William C. Brown, Charles D. White, and Thomas E. Black. The addresses are: 123 Main Street, New York, N.Y.; 456 Elm Street, Boston, Mass.; 789 Oak Street, Philadelphia, Pa.; 101 Pine Street, Washington, D.C.; and 202 Cedar Street, Baltimore, Md.

ence and ideation. The vivifying and enlightening influence of the soul fits it for this twofold task, which it undertakes under the impression that it is competent without extraneous aid to enjoy what it creates. Thus its pure potentiality changes into the actuality of the world on the one hand and of the individual self on the other. Both are quarried out of the same substance, while consciousness or the soul, which is obviously responsible for the cleavage and development along parallel lines is declared to exist in a state of absolute detachment from them.

The net result, again, of all this activity is pain. Sadness cleaves to all finite life and is, therefore, the portion of thought which bears the impress of finitude in all its infinite variety of form. But it affects also the soul or impersonal consciousness in so far as this identifies itself with the empirical ego which sets itself in opposition to the world of objects. The illusion, however, is said to belong to thought because it is a limited and impermanent mental state. So it is not clear how consciousness which simply reveals, besides revealing this illusion, comes under its influence and surrenders in consequence the serenity of the absolute for the unpleasant feeling of being conditioned or fettered. May it not be that this so-called illusion is an

inevitable stage in the progress of the soul which has yet to realise that the absolute comprehends the all-pervasive relativism which is testified to by experience? The shadow of relativity does, indeed, brood everywhere at present. But should it not be taken as the necessarily partial light of limited values which when restricted to their proper sphere, will be found to have legitimate places in the absolute?

The Sāṃkhya is never as a matter of fact very far from these thoughts. It allows reality of a kind to the world of phenomena. They are not such stuff as dreams are made of. It recognises also the supreme fact that the empirical finite has always been the chosen home of the soul. But it repudiates at the same time all real connection between the two in deference to its theory of deliverance, which is based on the idea that if the soul appears to be limited or conditioned at any time, its complete freedom must be problematical ever

duct of this transformation, which is moreover so complete as to obscure the distinction between the unqualified principle of consciousness and its own limited manifestations.

These are characterised, however, as impostors because they pose as integral parts of the soul or as objects in which it must be interested, when as a matter of fact its simplicity precludes the possession of parts and its completeness the possibility of interest. Thought then injures us by giving a false peculiar colouring to its own creations, which become in consequence 'the charm and torment of our vain years.' We live thus in a world of triumphant make-believe, and our so-called life is in truth progress in self-deception or a wearisome process of slow suicide. But thought which is held responsible for this unsatisfactory result is capable of a higher use too, and it is called at last to the higher destiny when the conviction dawns on it that the showy superstructure which it has built up with measureless toil and trouble is not the proper home for the soul. The latter, it is true, does not obtain release from the treacherous allurements of the world till as a consequence of wearisome experience the misery of thought sinks to rest in the stillness of a mere potentiality. But even so, this emancipation is a slow process merely because thought can

of experience which might justify the doctrine of an eventual and complete divorce between them and the soul. Nor is it easy to conceive what the soul can be like after the abstraction of the living and growing self which stands, over against the world and divides with it the responsibility for whatever is done or felt or thought. The pulsation and throbbing of the intellect belongs to this self as much as the visible activities in which intellect expresses itself. And we have no compelling reason for regarding the series thus constituted as a logically consistent dream which must be repugnant to the fully awakened consciousness.

Due weight has, of course, to be attached to a line of criticism like the above. But considerations hardly less weighty in the opinion of its advocates lead the Sāmkhya to draw a deep and broad line between the soul and what is regarded as its imperfect counterpart. First of all there is the belief in its existence as an independent entity not to be confused with the fleeting states which compose our phenomenal life. Then there is the yearning in every thoughtful breast for the absolute simplicity of a deeper form of being than that revealed in our perceptions, memories and expectations,—of a completed consciousness for which the apparent transitoriness and contingency of objects and events cannot exist. Of such

ment may be, it has to be sought, for neither charity nor innocence can be of any avail without the knowledge that discriminates the true self from that which originating in partial experience still poses as the entirety of our being. We live diminished lives in the midst of darkness as long as this intercepts the light. So deliverance from it ought not to wear for us the aspect of a doom.

Such is the teaching of the Sámkhya. It does not, of course, walk along the secure path of positive knowledge. But it refuses also to take the steep road from such knowledge to the lonely heights of monism. And when rightly interpreted, it appears to be a cautious return from the abstractions of metaphysics to a higher level of common-sense. For instead of climbing beyond the limits of certain general and almost inevitable beliefs, it turns round to find honourable house-room for them on the ground that they rule our life. They are the belief in a world extended in space and developing in time, the belief in a plurality of souls as abiding realities not to be confused with the shifting moods and transient activities of the mind and the conviction that an inexorable law presides over what we call the moral world so that what we sow we are bound to reap. These in some form or other, crude or refined, constitute the creed of common-

For like every other great system of thought it represents a distinct view-point from which the mystery of man's complex nature may be contemplated.

This mystery is due to the presence in him of elements which are apparently irreconcilable. There is his 'pleasing, anxious being' of which he knows so much as to be inclined at times to conclude that nothing exists beyond it. But it is never the same for two successive moments, and it may, for aught that he knows, vanish completely like coloured air-bubbles into empty space. Over against it, however, there is a reality of which he knows, indeed, nothing, though he feels that it endures in changeless repose, observing whatever happens to the other, but never identifying itself with the shifting moods that it observes.

We have systems of philosophy which deny all reality to this feeling and ask us to abjure it in order that we may keep our intellectual integrity unimpaired. Existence is summed up, according to them, in the moods that pass and leave no trace, while the so-called observer is, they say, a phantom of the imagination to which an indifferent mask of reality is given by certain thinkers for perplexing the philosophical world with muddle and mystery. These thinkers, however, hold that life must be a poor thing in spite of its brilliant colouring

altogether disparate and constitute in literal truth distinct worlds between which there ought to be no points of contact. Yet contact of a kind there is owing to the practical disregard of this fundamental truth, and hence there is the anomaly of suffering. It will disappear, however, along with the partial forms of thought in the undistinguishable elements out of which they have sprung when this truth is rightly comprehended and the soul repudiates them in consequence.⁵² The external world also will suffer complete disintegration, for form and movement can exist in it only so long as there is somebody to take cognisance of them. But will the soul disappear at the same time? No, almost everything in the Sāmkhya and its tirades against Buddhism and Nihilism in particular are opposed to such a view.⁵³ It will cease, indeed, to observe what is external, irrational and manifold. But it may still comprehend its own abiding and inexhaustible reality which has so far suffered eclipse owing to the intrusion of foreign elements.

So when your eyes close in sheer weariness of living after the discovery of the great

⁵² *V. B.*, III. 8; says that true knowledge teaches us to check all sorts of mental activity and thus effects our deliverance from the three kinds of suffering.

⁵³ *A* and *V. B.*, V. 77—79 point out that the Buddhist salvation can never be an end as it means annihilation.

truth, you will not be annihilated. A new life will dawn on you unencumbered with the dwarfed and distorted knowledge of particulars which you have picked up bit by bit and which is your sole possession today. What the new knowledge will be like, you can not guess, for memory and imagination can not help you in the matter, just as they cannot help you in picturing your condition in dream sleep, which, whatever it may be, is beautifully blank so far as impressions from outside are concerned. But of this you may be sure that it will not be attended with that unpleasant sense of being conditioned or limited which is inseparable from your present knowledge. You will not be a plighted word-hunter and fancier that craves for the gratification of hourly satisfaction. Your mind will be full of unrest and deep perplexity in regard to matters which will dissolve in an instant of vision, and you will feel that to be there is to know, not to seek. Such, properly understood, is the doctrine of the Sutra. It is the doctrine that you have a right to expect the truth.

- Happiness, its reality, 1, 3, 7, 112.
 — its contingent character, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 29, 112.
 — its scarcity, 1, 6, 8, 103.
 — as an end, 2, 3, 7, 102.
- Idealism in the Sāmkhya, 74, 123, 124.
- Indiscrimination 23, 54, 81, 85, 88, 89, 104, 125—127.
- Knowledge, 13, 100 107—108.
- Law and the cosmic process, 49, 50, 58, 123.
- Memory, 27, 34.
- Mental activity, 13, 14, 29—31, 32, 33, 37, 121.
- Mind, its age and pervasiveness, 33, 64, 71—73.
- Morality, its nature and scope, 14, 15, 109, 114, 115.
- Nature in the Sāmkhya, 56—58, 61, 62, 117—120.
 — in modern science, 52, 60.
 — its independence, 52, 53, 79.
 — its factors, 46—49, 118—120.
 — its relation to the soul, 54, 55, 79, 80.
 — its activity beginningless and endless, 56—58.
- Neutral monism and the Sāmkhya, 44.
- Passions, 12, 89, 94, 96, 98, 131.
- Passionlessness, 96, 97, 113, 115.
- Perception and related activities, 27—29, 30, 31, 35.
- Pessimism in Hindu philosophy, 111.
 — in the Sāmkhya, 8, 112.
- Progress in the Sāmkhya, 3, 12, 82, 126, 127.
- Realism in the Sāmkhya, 45, 74, 75.
- Religion and Hindu Philosophy, 9.
- Religious sacrifices, 5, 114.
- Science and philosophy, 9, 60.
- Self, true and false, 81, 105, 106, 131, 132.
- Self-consciousness, 64, 65, 78.
- Sensibility, its pervasiveness, 73.
- Souls, their nature according to the Sāmkhya, 18, 19, 109.
 — their multiplicity, 20—22.
 — their normal condition, 23, 105, 137.
 — their relation to the body, 70, 71, 93.
 — popular conception of them, 25, 26.
 — Buddhistic conception of them, 25, 34.
 — modern scientific conception of them, 36, 44.
- Subjectivism in the Sāmkhya, 75, 78.
- Substance and attribute, 18, 59.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

History of Land Tenure in England. Second Edition, 1924, 380 pages, Rs. 5/-.

Sir Paul Vinogradoff.—It seemed to me to be, on the whole a clear and fair exposition of the subject and likely to be useful to students.

Professor E. Lipson.—It covers a good deal of ground, and its lucid and comprehensive treatment of the subject ought to make it useful to both students in helping them to understand English land tenure problems.

Professor T. F. Tait.—I have read the History and I think it is a careful and scholarly summary of what is known of a difficult and somewhat technical subject put in a clear and attractive form.

Imperial Economic Review.—It is a valuable study of the inter-time course of the English land tenure and for the new land tenure topics.

Study of English Tenure of Land. 1922, 2-1 pages, Rs. 4/-.

Professor F. W. Taussig.—I observe that you have read widely on the subject and indeed seem to have covered the literature bearing on it.

American Economic Review.—The book is of great interest and value to the student of land economics and of economic theory.

Higher Education in Bengal under British Rule. 1926, 252 pages, Rs. 4/8/-.

Marquis of Ronaldshay.—It gives an admirable and impartial account of the gradual growth of the system and is, at the same time, written in a refreshing and vigorous style which keeps the interest of the reader throughout the narrative.

Viscount Haldane.—Principal Ghosh seems to me to have made a wise and comprehensive study of educational conditions in India. With what he says of the value of Sanskrit as a means of developing the true classical learning for Indians I am in much sympathy.

Professor M. Winternitz.—The historical part of the book is very instructive and contains much valuable information. I quite agree with the author that a true synthesis of all that is in Indian culture with what is valuable in the thought and practice of the West is most desirable. I also agree with him in holding that ways and means should be found for combining proficiency in science with literary training, and a liberal education aiming at moral and intellectual improvement with technical and vocational training. Needless to say that I am in full sympathy with the author's claim that Sanskrit

should keep its honoured place in any scheme of higher studies for Indian students.

Sir Valentine Chirol.—I have read it with very great interest, and I must add, with much personal gratification at seeing how largely your own large experience bears out the conclusions which I first formulated in my 'Indian Unrest' and developed still further in my volume on 'India'. . . . I sincerely hope that educationists of the liberal and broad-minded school whose views you set forth so clearly and dispassionately will derive some help....

Professor Carlo Formichi.—I have gone through your book with keenest interest. . . . I appreciate your point of view highly, and I hope it will be the lighthouse of the new Indian generation.

Times Educational Supplement.—For the two earlier

